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THE FOURTH AMENDMENT AND THE LAW OF ARREST*
RICHARD M. LEAGRE
The author is a member of the bars of the states of Ohio and Indiana. He was graduated from Ohio
Northern University with high distinction in 1959 and from the Harvard Law School cum laude in
1962. Mr. Leagre served for a year as Law Clerk to Chief Justice Kingsley Taft of the Ohio Supreme
Court prior to entering the practice of law in Indianapolis.
A long-standing controversy exists between those who support the traditional requirement of
probable cause as grounds for any type of "arrest" and those who would allow "detention" upon
grounds less than probable cause. The latter group has generally supported the provisions of the
Uniform Arrest Act, which would permit a limited period of detention by the police on grounds less
than probable cause. What, though, of the constitutional validity of such detention legislation? Does
the Fourth Amendment permit any relaxation of the traditional standard? If possibly so, what
standard for detention would be valid? And what standard would be workable? In the following
article, Mr. Leagre considers these and related questions, analyzing both the historical material
which bears on the problems and the recent developments in federal and state law which relate thereto. The author's conclusions and proposals relate not only to the problem of initial detention, but
also to the nature and extent of police activity that might be permitted or required subsequent theretO.-EDITOR.
"It must always be remembered that what the Constitution forbids is not all searches
and seizures, but unreasonable searches and seizures.... [I]t can fairly be said that in
applying the Fourth Amendment this Court has seldom shown itself unaware of the
practical demands of effective criminal investigation and law enforcement."
Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 222 (1960).
I. INTRODUCTION
Two relatively recent cases, Rios v. United
States' and United States v. Bonanno,2 have highlighted a problem which was first squarely raised
some 20 years ago by the promulgation of the
Uniform Arrest Act by the Interstate Commission
4
3
on Crime. Section two of the act purports to give

authority to peace officers to stop, question, and
if necessary, detain for two h6urs, any person
"abroad." Section three s of the act gives an
officer authority to "frisk" or search such a person.
The important element in this proposal, however,
is that it purports to allow such activities upon a

"(2) Any person so questioned who fails to identify
himself or explain his actions to the satisfaction of the
officer may be detained and further questioned and investigated.
"(3) The total period of detention provided for by
1364 U.S. 253 (1960).
2180 F.Supp. 71 (S.D.N.Y.), rev'd on other grounds this section shall not exceed two hours. The detention is
sub nor. United States v. Bufalino, 285 F.2d 408 (2d not an arrest and shall not be recorded as an arrest in
any official record. At the end of the detention the
1960).
Cir.
3
The Act is printed in full in Warner, The Uniform person so detained shall be released or be arrested and
Arrest Act, 28 VA. L. REv. 315, 343-47 (1942). It has charged with a crime." Warner, supra note 3, at 344.
5 "Section 3. Searching for Weapons. Persons Who
been adopted in whole or in part in three states: Delaware, New Hampshire, and Rhode Island. Each of Have Not Been Arrested.
"A peace officer may search for a dangerous weapon
these states has enacted §§2 and 3. DEL. CODE ANN. tit.
11, §§1902-1903 (1951); N.H.REv.STAT. ch. 594, §§2-3 any person whom he has stopped or detained to question
as provided in section 2, whenever he has reasonable
(1941); R.I.GEN.LAws tit. 12, ch. 7, §§1-2 (1941).
ground to believe that he is in danger if the person
4"Section 2. Questioning and DetainingSuspects.
"(1) A peace officer may stop any person abroad possesses a dangerous weapon. If the officer finds a
who he has reasonable ground to suspect is committing, weapon, he may take and keep it until the completion
has committed or is about to commit a crime, and may of the questioning, when he shall either return it or
demand of him his name, address, business abroad and arrest the person. The arrest may be for the illegal possession of the weapon." Ibid.
whither he is going.
article is a revision of a paper originally submitted to Professor Paul Freund of the Harvard Law
School in the Seminar on Constitutional Litigation.
* This
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showing by an officer of a substantially lesser
degree of mental con-,iction than has traditionally
been required to sustain an arrest. Although the
language used is not significantly different from
the traditional formulation, 6 it is clear from the
draftmen's comments that the statutory intent is
to permit such detention in circumstances where
the officer would not be allowed to arrest under
traditional law.7 The existence of such a power to
detain as a constitutional matter under the Fourth
Amendment, s however, was only recently presented in the Rios and Bonanno cases. Both cases
involved interference with the freedom of movement of automobiles and their passengers on
grounds substantially less than would have justified either the issuance of a warrant of arrest or an
arrest without a warrant. 9 In both cases, the
government agreed that the Fourth Amendment
required probable cause for a formal arrest, but
contended that the actions of the police in the
instant cases were neither "formal arrests" nor
"seizures" of the person such as would require
probable cause. In Bonanno, Judge Kaufman in
the district court accepted this argument.' 0 After
'Section 21(c) and (d) of the American Law Institute's Code of Criminal Procedure (official draft 1930)

speaks in terms of "reasonable ground to believe." The
Uniform Arrest Act's formula is "reasonable ground to
suspect." See supra note 4. It is interesting to note that
in a recent decision involving this section of the Act, the
Delaware Supreme Court avoided the constitutional
issue by holding that "suspect" and "believe" are
equivalents. De Salvatore v. State, 163 A.2d 244 (Del.
1960).
7 Warner, supra note 3, at 317-24.
' The Fourth Amendment requires probable cause
both for the issuance of a warrant of arrest, Giordenello v. United States, 357 U.S. 480 (1958), and for an
arrest without a warrant, Henry v. United States, 361
U.S. 98 (1959); Draper v. United States, 358 U.S. 307
(1959).
9In Rios, two police officers were in a neighborhood
with a reputation for narcotics. They saw the defendant
come out of a building and get into a waiting taxi.
They followed, and when the taxi stopped for a traffic
light, they got out and approached it from both sides.
There was no actual detention since when the officers
identified themselves, the defendant became frightened,
dropped his narcotics, and ran.
In Bonanno, the officers were aware that what would
later be known as the Apalachin meeting was taking
place on the estate of Joe Barbara, Sr. They had nothing
but the vaguest of suspicions about what was going on,
however. They set up a roadblock on the public road
leading from the estate and stopped every unfamiliar
automobile and identified and interrogated the occupants. Some of the defendants were taken to a nearby
police station for further interrogation.
10"I believe that the relative dearth of authority in
point can be explained by the fact that few litigants
have ever seriously contended that it was illegal for an
officer to stop and question a person unless he had
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holding that no technical arrest took place under
New York law,1 he upheld the validity of the
detention under the Fourth Amendment. "While
the Fourth Amendment may be construed as
encompassing 'seizure' of an individual, it cannot
be contended that every detention of an individual
is such a seizure."' 2 Unfortunately for present
purposes, the case was reversed on appeal by the
Second Circuit without discussion of the detention
3
issue.
Moreover, in Rios, the Supreme Court ai oided
a square holding on the issue by remanding to the
district court for a clarification of the facts. Since
Rios was a companion case to Elkins v. United

States, 4 which invalidated the so-called "silver
platter" doctrine, the Court felt that further
consideration should be given at the trial level to
the legality of the officers' conduct. 15 Thus it has
been said that the Court ambiguously by-passed
the important issue presented."6 This action,
however, when considered in connection with
'probable cause' for a formal arrest." 180 F. Supp. at
78.
It should be noted, however, that the case can be
explained on narrower grounds. The only question
actually involved was that of the admissibility of
voluntary statements made during the detention. Prior
to the recent decision in Wong Sun v. United States,
371 U.S. 471 (1963), such statements were generally
held admissible so long as they did not fall within the
rule of Mallory v. United States, 354 U.S. 449 (1957).
" United States v. Di Re, 332 U.S. 581 (1947), held
that the validity of an arrest without warrant made by
federal officers is dependent upon the law of the state
wherein the arrest takes place. It is doubtful, however,
whether state law is applicable to determine whether an
arrest took place. See Gilliam v. United States, 189
F.2d 321 (6th Cir. 1951); 109 U. PA. L. REv. 262
(1960).
12 180 F.Supp. at 78. It is not clear whether Judge
Kaufman means that it was not a "seizure" at all or
merely that it was not an "unreasonable seizure." Compare City of Miami v. Aronovitz, 114 So.2d 784 (Fla.
1959).
"3United States v. Bufalino, 285 F.2d 408 (2d Cir.
1960). Judge Clark, concurring, did mention that he
thought the police action "highly dubious." Id. at
420 n.3.
14 364 U.S. 206 (1960). State officers in both cases had
originally obtained the incriminating evidence.
16 "For all that appears, this ruling may have been
based solely upon the silver platter doctrine." 364 U.S.
at 253.
16 "The court dealt with the issue with traditional
ambiguity, returning the case to the trial court to
determine when the arrest was made without giving
explicit attention at all to the issue of whether a right
to stop and question exists apart from arrest and, if it
does, within what kinds of limitations." Remington,
The Law Relating to "On the Street" Detention, Questioning and Frisking of Suspected Persons and Police Arrest
Prizileges in General, 51 J. CIM. L., C. & P.S. 388,
390-91 (1960).
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r
Henry v. United States, decided earliet the same

term, at least suggests that some right of detention
less than that occasioned by a formal arrest may
exist under the Fourth Amendment. In Henry,
a similar factual situation was involved; officers
stopped the defendant's car on grounds substantially less than "probable cause."' 8 The detention
issue was not argued by the government, however,
since a concession had been made in the lower
courts that an arrest occurred when the car was
stopped. The Court, after noting the government's concession, went on to say: "That is our
view on the facts of this particular case. When the
officers interrupted the two men and restricted
their liberty of movement, the arrest, for purposes
of this case, was complete."' 9 Nevertheless, despite
the government's concession and the Court's
careful language, Henry was read by some as
laying down a general rule that such interference0
with liberty of movement constitutes an arrest.'
If this interpretation were accurate, however, it
would seem that the Court could have disposed of
Rios by merely citing Henry; the Court did not
purport to differentiate the cases on the basis of
the factual distinction that in Rios the taxi was
already stopped at a traffic light.2L Rather the
"1361 U.S. 98 (1959).
'sThere was some slight suspicion that the defendants had been involved in the theft of an interstate
shipment of whiskey. The officers observed them loading their car, which was parked in an alley, with cartons
of unknown contents. The defendants made two such
trips; when they finished loading and drove off for the
second time, the officers followed and waved the car to
a stop. The subsequent search revealed not whiskey, but
stolen radios.
9361 U.S. at 103. (Emphasis added.) The dissent
had something further to say about the government's
concession. "While the government, unnecessarily it
seems to me, conceded that the arrest was made at the
time the car was stopped, this Court is not bound by
the government's mistakes." Id. at 104-05.
20 109 U. PA. L. Rlv. 262 (1960).
" Henry could, however, perhaps be distinguished on
its particular facts without adverting to the government's concession. Presumably the officers in Henry did
not stop the car merely to question its occupants but to
ascertain the contents of the cartons. Assuming the
existence of a right to stop and question, it does not
follow that this right could be used as a subterfuge to
search. Where the authority of a highway patrolman to
stop and check a driver's license was so misused, it was
held that a resulting search was illegal. Robertson v.
State, 184 Tenn. 277, 198 S.W.2d 633 (1947). Cf. Able v.
United States, 362 U.S. 217 (1960), where the court
indicated that the use of an administrative warrant for
the purpose of gathering evidence for a criminal
prosecution would be invalid.
Thus, it could be argued that in Henry, the purpose
to search had to be supported by probable cause at the
time the car was stopped. See Brinegar v. United

Court seemed to indicate that a brief detention
for interrogation would be upheld. "But the
government argues that the policemen approached
the standing taxi only for the purpose of routine
interrogation, and that they had no intent to
detain the petitioner beyond the momentary
requirements of such a mission.""2 Thus it seems
clear that, at the very least, Rios stands for the
proposition that not every police inquiry and the
resulting restriction of movement need be deemed
an arrest.
It must be admitted, however, that this is about
as far as the opinion in Rios can be stretched. The
peculiar factual situation involved makes it a
very appealing case in which to uphold the officers'
conduct.n Moreover, the Court's opinion is
ambiguous and, at best, touches only the periphery
of the problem. Because of recent developments in
the law the scope of any right of temporary
detention has become of vastly increased significance. This is due both to the application of the
exclusionary rule" to the states through the due
process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment"5
and to the recent decision in lVmg Sun v. United
States,2 which applied the exclusionary rule to
voluntary oral declarations made during the course
of an unconstitutional arrest. These cases, taken
together, substantially increase the amount of
police activity subject to the sanction of exclusion
of evidence unconstitutionally obtained and,
because of the exclusion of oral declarations, make
the ability to convict more frequently dependent
upon the legality of an interference with freedom
of movement.2 At this stage in the development of
States, 338 U.S. 160 (1949); Carroll v. United States,
267 U.S. 132 (1925).
2364 U.S. at 262.
2On remand to the district court, Judge Hall upheld
the police action on the grounds that there had been no
actual stopping or detaining. United States v. Rios, 192
F. Supp. (S.D. Cal. 1961).
'4Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
21 Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961). In view of the
very recent decision in Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23
(1963), it is clear that the specific requirements of the
Fourth Amendment will be enforced against the states
through the due process clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. The following discussion will thus assume
generally that such is the case. For a thorough treatment of this subject prior to Ker, see, e.g., Allen,
Federalism and the Fourth Amendment: A Requiem for
Wolf, 1961 Sup. CT.RaV. 1; Weinstein, Local Responsibility
for Improvement of Search and Seizure Practice,34
RocK Mr. L. Rv.150 (1962).
26 371 U.S. 471 (1963).
27 Prior to Wong Sun the exclusionary rule had not
generally been applied to such oral declarations. See
note 33 infra.
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the law, it is deemed appropriate to attempt a
further analysis of the Fourth Amendment and
the law of arrest.
I.

HISTORY AND INTERPRETATION OF
rns FOURTH AmENDMENT-THE LAW
RELATING TO SEARCHES AND SEIZURES

In order to make a right of temporary detention
meaningful, it must be held to exist on a showing
23
less than that required to justify an arrest.
Since probable cause is necessary for a valid
arrest, 29 the right to detain is urged to rest upon a
somewhat lesser ground; the formulation of the
Uniform Arrest Act in this regard is "reasonable
ground to suspect."" The justification for these
lesser grounds rests upon the conclusion that such
restraints on the individual are reasonable under
all the circumstances and hence constitutional
under the first clause of the Fourth Amendment
which prohibits only "unreasonable ... seizures
.... ,1 What this overlooks, however, is that

"unreasonable"

in the context of the Fourth

Amendment is a term of art; disputes over its

meaning have led to bitter differences of opinion
within the Court.n and the issue is not yet, and
28Even without relaxation of the requirement of
probable cause, such a right might be of significance if
it had the effect of avoiding the rule of Mallory v.
United States, 354 U.S. 449 (1957), whereby a confession
is excluded from federal court which has been obtained
after arrest and before arraignment, where arraignment
has not been made "without unnecessary delay" as required by FED. R. Cri. P. 5(a). Arguably, the rule
would not apply, since a "detention," rather than an
arrest, has been made. On policy grounds, however, it is
doubtful that such a distinction would be recognized
for purposes of the Mallory rule. Moreover, under
Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963), such
confessions under certain circumstances may now be
excluded by virtue of the Fourth Amendment. See text
following note 250 infra.
29 Cases cited note 8 supra.
30 See note 4 supra.
31U.S. CONST. amend. IV. The amendment provides

in full as follows:
"The right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable
searches and seizures shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by
oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the
place to be searched, and the persons or things to be
seized."
2
1 E.g., "For some years now the field has been
muddy, but today the Court makes it a quagmire."
Chapman v. United States, 365 U.S. 610, 622 (1961)
(Clark, J., dissenting); "We witness indeed an inquest
over a substantial part of the Fourth Amendment."
Frank v. Maryland, 359 U.S. 360, 374 (1959) (Douglas,
J., dissenting); "The divisions in this Court over the
years regarding what is and what is not to be deemed
an unreasonable search within the meaning of the
Fourth Amendment and the shifting views of members
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may well never be, clearly resolved. Certain basic
principles, however, have emerged from the
interpretation of the amendment in the multitude
of cases involving what is and what is not an
"unreasonable" search. Since the application of
the amendment to the law of arrest has been
infrequently litigated,n these cases can provide the
only available analogy in determining what is and
what is not an "unreasonable" seizure of the
person. Before turning to those cases, however, it
is appropriate in an area in which the opinions are
replete with reliance upon history34 to briefly
reiterate the background and formulation of the
Fourth Amendment.
A. The Formuktion of the Fourth Amendment

The abuses which triggered the demand for a
protection against searches and seizures in the
United States are well known; they were the use
of the general warrant in England and its American
counterpart, the writ of assistance, in the
Colonies.35 In England, the general warrant had
of the court in this regard, prove that in evolving the
meaning of the Fourth Amendment the decisions of this
Court have frequently turned on dialectical niceties and
have not reflected those fundamental considerations of
civilized conduct on which applications of the Due
Process Clause turn." Elkins v. United States, 364
U.S. 209, 238-39 (1960) (Frankfurter, J.).
-1Search and seizure law has developed so rapidly
due to the importance of the application of the exclusionary rule. The reasons for the present failure of
similar developments on the arrest side of the Amendment are threefold: (1) An unlawful arrest does not deprive the court of jurisdiction over the person, Ker v.
Illinois, 119 U.S. 436, 440 (1886); see Albrecht v.
United States, 273 U.S. 1 (1927); (2) prior to the recent
decision in Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471
(1963), statements made during the course of an unconstitutional arrest, the closest analogy to property unlawfully seized, had not generally been held subject to
the exclusionary rule, e.g., United States v. Bonanno,
180 F.Supp. 71 (S.D.N.Y.), rev'd on other grounds sub

nom. United States v. Bufalino, 285 F.2d 408 (2d Cir.
1960); but see Neuslein v. District of Columbia, 115
F.2d 690 (D.C. Cir. 1940) (Vinson J., later Chief
Justice Vinson); see generally, Kamisar, Illegal Searches
or Seizures and Contemporaneous Incriminating Statements: A Dialogue on a Neglected Area of Criminal Procedure, 1961 U. ILL. L.F. 78; (3) in those cases where the
exclusionary rule would apply to property illegally

seized during the course of a search incident to an
arrest, the legality of the arrest is usually not contested
and the issue presented is the reasonable extent of the
search, e.g., Harris v. United States, 331 U.S. 145
(1947); United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56
(1950); Kremen v. United States, 353 U.S. 346 (1957).
1 E.g., Frank v. Maryland, 359 U.S. 360 (1959);
Abel v. United States, 362 U.S. 217 (1960).
22 Fraenkel, Concerning Searches and Seizures, 34
HARv. L. REv. 361 (1921); see generally LAssox, THE

HISTORY AND DRVELOPmENT Or THE FouRTm AMEND-

MENT TO THE UNITED STATES CoNsnTruTioN (1937).
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served a variety of purposes; it had been used in
the course of ordinary criminal administration as
well as in customs enforcement and the suppression
of seditious libel. 6 Although Hale had early written
that such warrants were void,3' the practice
persisted until shortly before the American Revolution when a series of cases38 culminating in the
famous decision in Entick v. Carrington;9 held them
invalid.
Contemporaneously, in the Colonies, the use of
the writs of assistance 4 was creating the first of a
series of frictions which was to lead directly to
revolution. The purpose of the writ was to allow
search by customs officers for smuggled goods from
the West Indies.41 Its most objectionable feature,
which distinguished it from the English general
warrant, was that it was not returnable after
execution, but was good as a continuing license
during the lifetime of the sovereign. 42 It was, in
fact, the expiration of these writs in 1761 after the
death of George II which gave James Otis the
opportunity for his famous oration against general
warrants. Although he lost the case and new writs
were issued. the importance of his eloquent
protest cannot be minimized. 40
The importance of this history prior to the
drafting of the Fourth Amendment lies in its
indication that the chief concern in the colonists'
minds was probably with the issuance of general
36 LAssox, op. cil. supranote 35, at 37-50.
7 2 HALE, PLEAS OF THE CRONVN 110-14, 150 (lst

am. ed. 1847). "And therefore I do take it, that a
general warrant to search in all suspected places is not
good, but only to search in such particular places,
where the party assigns before the justice his suspicion
and the probable cause thereof, for these warrants are
judicial acts, and must be granted upon examination of
the fact." Id. at 150.
mHuckle v. Money, 2 \Vils. K.B. 206, 95 Eng. Rep.
631 (1763); Wilkes v. Wood, Lofft 1, 98 Eng. Rep. 489,
19 How St. Tr. 981 (1763); Money v. Leach, 3 Burr.
1692, 97 Eng. Rep. 1050, 19 How St. Tr. 1001 (1765).
* 2 Wils K.B. 275, 95 Eng. Rep. 807, 19 How St. Tr.
1029 (1765). This case has been frequently cited in
interpretation of the Fourth Amendment. E.g., Boyd v.
United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886); Frank v. Maryland,
3594 U.S. 360 (1959).
0So named because they commanded all subjects to
assist in their execution. Lssox, op. cit. supra note 35,
at 53-54.
41 Id. at 51-78.
42 Id. at 54.
43
Id. at 62-63.
4 The effect of his argument on John Adams is well
known. Adams later wrote: "Then and there was the
first scene of opposition to the arbitrary claims of Great
Britain. Then and there the child Independence was
born. In 15 years, namely in 1776, he grew to manhood, and declared himself free." 10 WORKS OF JOHN
AD~ms at 248 (1856).

warrants. Support for this argument can, in fact,
be found from the record of the events immediately
preceding the amendment's formulation and
adoption by the House of Representatives. The
original draft was prepared by James Mladison
and read as follows:
"The rights of the people to be secured in
their persons, their houses, their papers, and
their other property, from all unreasonable
searches and seizures, shall not be violated by
warrants issued without probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, or not particularly
describing the places to be searched, or the
45
persons or things to be seized."
Along with other proposals, it was then referred to
a Committee of Eleven 4" who reported it to the
full House in the following form:
"The right of the people to be secured in their
persons, houses, papers, and effects, shall not
be violated by warrants issuing without probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation,
and not particularly describing the place to be
searched, and the persons or things to be
seized." 47
Apparently, the full debate on the provision did
not take long. Gerry noticed the mistake in wording
and that the phrase "unreasonable searches and
seizures" of the original Madison proposal had
been left out and moved that the first clause be
amended to approximately its present form.13
The motion passed and a further motion was made
by Benson.
"Mr. Benson objected to the words 'by
warrants issuing.' This declaratory provision
was good as far as it went, but he thought it was
not sufficient; he therefore proposed to alter it
so as to read 'and no warrant shall issue.'
The question was put on this motion, and
lost by a considerable majority."49
Had the amendment passed in this form its
scope as a matter of historical intent would be
clear; the prohibition of general warrants was the
sole concern of the "considerable" majority of the
members of the House. The insertion of the
protection "against unreasonable searches and
451 AN.Ls OF CoNG. 434-35 (1789).
46
Id.at 664-65.
4
1Id.at 754.
48 "Mr. Gerry said he presumed there was a mistake
in the wording of this clause; it ought to be 'the right of
the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers,
and effects, against unreasonable seizures and searches'
and therefore moved that amendment." Ibid.
49Ibid.
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seizures" was interded not to impose additional
standards but merely by way of preface to the
prohibition of general warrants.
In the next stage in the formulation of the final
draft, however, the amendment reached its present
form. Mr. Benson, whose proposal to broaden the
amendment into two clauses had been rejected,
was appointed chairman of a Committee of Three
whose duties were to arrange all the proposed
amendments. When the committee reported back
to the House, the amendment apparently appeared
in its present form and was approved without
further discussion or comment.50
Unfortunately, the records of the amendment's
progress through the House is the only source of
discussion available, since the Senate sat in secret
session during this period.5 Yet even from the
meagre background, it seems dear that the amendment as finally adopted and ratified contemplated
something more than a mere prohibition of general
warrants. By its division into two clauses the
amendment was given a broader scope; the
protection against unreasonable searches and
seizures was thus intended to have independent
substantive content. 2 It remained, however, for
the courts to determine the nature of that content.
B. Defining "Unreasonable"-The Development in
the Courts
Although the history of the amendment may
indicate that the first clause was intended to have
independent substantive content, it affords no
guide in determining the nature of that content.
Faced with this problem, what were the alternatives available to the Court? It would seem that
there were at least five possible interpretations
which the Court could logically have reached.
Possibility Number One. Warrants will issue only
according to the specific requirements imposed
by the second clause of the amendment. The first
clause of the amendment requires that searches
conducted pursuant to such a warrant must, in
addition, be conducted reasonably. If warrants
are not involved, however, the amendment does
50Id. at 779.
51 LAssoN,

op. cit. supra note 35, at 102 n.86. The

debates in the state ratifying conventions shed no
additional light on the matter. Fraenkel, supra note 35,
at 365-66.
62It seems clear that this was Benson's purpose in
altering it, if he was the one who did so. He thought the
provision was "good as far as it went" but "it was not

sufficient." See note 49 supra. Lasson, op. cit. supra
note 35, at 103.
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not apply. The validity of searches without a
warrant is subject only to the broader limitations
imposed by a requirement of due process of law.53
Possibility Number Two. The amendment
contains an overriding prohibition of "unreasonableness." All searches, whether with or without
warrants, must be instituted and conducted
reasonably. In addition, all warrants are subject
to the specific requirements of the second clause
of the amendment
Possibility Number Three. All searches must be
conducted reasonably. However, there is no such
thing as a reasonable search unless authorized by
a warrant. "The plain import of this [history] is
that searches are 'unreasonable' unless authorized
by a warrant, and a warrant hedged about by
adequate safeguards. 'Unreasonable' is not to be
determined with reference to a particular search
and seizure considered in isolation."k
Possibility Number Four. The Fourth Amendment imposes an overriding requirement of
reasonableness on all searches, whether with or
without a warrant. Normally, however, a warrant
must be obtained or a good reason shown for the
failure to do so or the search ipso facto will be
deemed unreasonable. "When the Fourth Amendment outlawed 'unreasonable searches' and then
went on to define the very restricted authority
that even a search warrant issued by a magistrate
could give, the framers said with all the clarity of
the gloss of history that a search is 'unreasonable'
5 In view of the purpose of a constitutional prohibition against general searches, such an interpretation
would seem untenable. Yet implications of such a view
as regarding searches not instituted for the purpose of
enforcing the criminal law can be found in Frank v.
Maryland, 359 U.S. 360 (1959) (state healthinspection).
See Note, 11 SvmAcusx L. REv. 94, 97 (1959-1960).
"According to the majority, the attempted health inspection is without the amendment ...
." A similar
problem may arise if temporary detentions are not
deemed "seizures" within the meaning of the amendment. See United States v. Bonanno, 180 F. Supp. 71
(S.D.N.Y.), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. United
States v. Bufalino, 285 F.2d 408 (2d Cir. 1960).
Note that this interpretation would make the amendment essentially only a prohibition against general warrants yet would add to its scope by requiring "reasonableness" in the execution of the warrant and not merely
in its issuance. See United States v. Willis, 85 F. Supp.
745 (S.D. Cal. 1949).
u Taken out of context from the dissenting opinion of
Mr. Justice Frankfurter in Harris v. United States, 331
U.S. 145, 161-62 (1947). He goes on to limit the statement as follows: "This means that, with minor and
severely confined exceptions, inferentially a part of the
amendment, every search and seizure is unreasonable
when made without a magistrate's authority expressed
through a validly issued warrant." Id. at 162.
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unless a warrant authorizes it, barring only
exceptions justified by absolute necessity.""5
Possibility Number Five. All searches must be
conducted reasonably, but it is a flexible requirement depending on the particular case. "What is a
reasonable search is not to be determined by any
fixed formula."5" "It is appropriate to note that
the constitution does not say that the right of the
people to be secure in their persons should not be
violated without a search warrant if it is practicable for the officers to procure one. The mandate
of the Fourth Amendment is that the people shall
be secure against unreasonable searches."" "The
relevant question is not whether it is reasonable to
procure a search warrant but whether the search
was reasonable.""9
At least two of the five listed possibilities can
be dispensed with in a summary manner. The
suggestion in possibility number one that searches
without warrants are not subject to the requirements of the amendment has gained no headway
with the very doubtful exception of the administrative search cases.59 Possibility number three
seems never to have been seriously suggested; even
the most rigorous adherents to the requirement of
a warrant have recognized the existence of certain
exceptions.6"
Other standards, suggested throughout the five
possibilities, have been observed. Thus, a search
55Mr. Justice Frankfurter, dissenting in United
States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56, 70 (1950).
56 United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56, 63
(1950) (Minton, J.).
57Id. at 65.
Id.at 66.
69Frank v. Maryland, 359 U.S. 360 (1959); Abel v.
United States, 362 U.S. 217 (1960). Even here the
better interpretation of these cases is that they merely
held that reasonableness is composed of different
elements when the object of the search is for purposes
other than the enforcement of the criminal law.
For a view that searches without warrants prior to
United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56 (1950), were
without the scope of the amendment, see Note, Search
and Seizure in the Supreme Court: Shadows on the
Fourth Amendment, 28 U. Cm. L. REv. 664, 678-86
(1961).
0
G
See, e.g., notes 54 and 55 supra. Leaving aside the
question of a search of the person incident to arrest,
which may be justifiable as a part of the process of
seizure of the person, Harris v. United States, 331 U.S.
145, 196 (1947) (dissenting opinion of Jackson, J.), it
does not appear that an absolute requirement of a
warrant would be totally indefensible. At any rate,
criticism of the exceptions which have developed has
not been lacking. E.g., Fraenkel, Recent Dezelopments in
the Federal Law of Searches and Seizures, 33 IowA L.
R.v. 472, 477-80 (1948) (criticizing Harris);Black, A
Critique of the Carroll Case, 29 CoLum. L. Rxv. 1068
(1929) (criticizing Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132
(1925)).

warrant will issue only in conformance with the
second clause of the amendment. "If a search
warrant be constitutionally required, the requirement cannot be flexibly interpreted to dispense
with the rigorous constitutional restrictions for its
issue."'" Finally, it is clear that any search, even
though valid on grounds of probable cause, must,
in addition, be conducted reasonably.62
Broadly speaking, however, possibility number
two, imposing an overriding requirement of
reasonableness, seems to be the one which the
Court has adopted. It will be observed that
possibilities four and five are really nothing more
than alternate interpretations of this overriding
requirement of reasonableness; the struggle between these interpretations, however, has been
the chief cause of disharmony in the search and
seizure area in recent years. The early understanding of the amendment was in accord with
possibility number four that a warrant was required to make a search reasonable, subject to
narrow exceptions." The first of these exceptions
is found in Carroll v. United States,34 which
recognized the necessity for dispensing with the
requirement of a warrant when moving6 vehicles
were involved. The Court realized that insisting
upon the requirement of a warrant in these circumstances would afford ample opportunity for
the owner to remove his suspect automobile
prior to the time the officers were authorized to
search. This exception from the requirement of a
warrant was thus grounded on a showing of absolute necessity on the facts of the particular case.
Because of this requirement of necessity the
61 Frank v. Maryland, 359 U.S. 360, 373 (1959)
(opinion of Frankfurter, J.) (holding that a search
warrant was not constitutionally required under the
circumstances).
62See, e.g., United States v. Costner, 153 F.2d 23
(6th Cir. 1940); United States v. Willis, 85 F. Supp. 745
(S.D. Cal. 1949).

63E.g.,

COOLEY,

CoNSmTUToNA.

imTATIoNs

424-34 (7th ed. 1903); CooLEY, CONSrT1rrONAL LAW
228-33 (3d ed. 1898).
267 U.S. 132 (1925). The implication that this
right was expressly conditioned on an enabling grant of
authority in the National Prohibition Act was negated
in Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160 (1949), where
the Carroll rule was applied in the absence of such
legislation.
65
InHusty v. United States, 282 U.S. 694 (1931), the
Carroll doctrine was applied to a parked vehicle which
could have been moved at any time. "In such circumstances we do not think the officers should be required
to speculate upon the chances of successfully carrying
out the search, after the delay and withdrawal from the
scene of one or more officers which would have been
necessary to procure a warrant." Id. at 701.
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Carroll doctrine was held inapplicable to the
search of a house in Agnello v. United States.66
Twenty-three years later, the principle was similarly expressed in Johnson v. United States,67 where
the Court held invalid the search of an apartment
without a warrant Later the same term, in dealing
with the broad right of search incident to a lawful
arrest opened up by Harris v. United States,"6 in
Trupiano v. United States,69 the Court indicated
that a search of this kind would not be upheld if
there was prior opportunity to obtain a search
warrant. The Fourth Amendment required that
"law enforcement agents must secure and use
search warrants wherever reasonably practicable." 70 Thus, at this point, the interpretation of
the amendment as imposing a strict requirement
of a warrant except in cases of necessity seemed
well settled. Yet only two years later, in upholding
the validity of such a search as incident to a lawful
arrest in United States v. Rabinowitz, the Court
stated that "to the extent that Trupiano v. United
States ...

requires a search warrant solely upon

the basis of the practicability of procuring it rather
than upon the reasonableness of the search after a
lawful arrest, that case is overruled.'rn
The final result, however, has been a blending of
possibility number four and possibility number
five, since two later cases 72 have held that a search
of a home cannot be conducted without a warrant;
Rabinowitz was distinguished on the sole ground
that the search there allowed was incident to a
lawful arrest. Thus, where no arrest is involved, a
warrant is constitutionally required except in
cases where a strong showing of necessity is made.
If such an arrest takes place, however, a search
66269 U.S. 20 (1925). "While the question has never
been directly decided by this court, it has always been
assumed, that one's house cannot lawfully be searched
without a search warrant, except as an incident to a
lawful arrest therein." Id. at 32.
67333 U.S. 10 (1948). "The point of the Fourth
Amendment... is not that it denies law enforcement
the support of usual inferences which reasonable men
draw from evidence. Its protection consists in requiring
that those inferences be drawn by a neutral and detached magistrate instead of being judged by the
officer.... When the right of privacy must reasonably
yield to the right of search is, as a rule, to be decided by
a judicial officer, not by a policeman or government enforcement agent." Id. at 13-14.
1,1331 U.S. 145 (1947). Harris authorized a broad
right to search the premises where an arrest took place
as a search incident to the arrest.
769334 U.S. 699 (1948).
0 Id. at 705.

71339 U.S. 56, 66 (1950).

72 Jones v. United States, 357 U.S. 493 (1958); Chapman v. United States, 365 U.S. 610 (1961).
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incident to that arrest is permissible absent any
showing of lack of opportunity to secure a warrant.
The validity of this distinction, turning solely on
the existence of an arrest, is understandably difficult for some members of the Court to acceptY3
Whether Trupiano or Rabinowitz is followed,
however, a further question of reasonableness
arises in those cases in which it is determined that a
search warrant is not constitutionally required.
Under Rabinowitz, this question arises immediately since there is no requirement of necessity
imposed. Under Trupiano, however, this question
arises only if the Court first determines that a
satisfactory excuse for failing to secure a warrant
has been given. Assuming this first step is satisfactorily passed the remaining issue under either
rule is the same-whether the search is valid as
tested by additional elements of reasonableness.74
This second step of the test of reasonableness is
of primary interest in the present connection.
What criteria would the Court utilize in determining whether a warrantless search was reasonable
within the meaning of the first clause of the amendment? For a court which emphasized the necessity
71In Chapman v. United States, 365 U.S. 610 (1961),
Mr. Justice Frankfurter concurred and Mr. justice
Clark dissented. Both interpreted the majority's
opinion as contra to Rabinowitz.
Mr. Justice Frankfurter stated: "The course of true
law pertaining to searches and seizures, as enunciated
here, has not-to put it mildly-run smooth.... The
reasoning by which the Court reaches its result would be
warranted were Trupiano ... still law..... Since the
Rabinowitz case expresses the prevailing view, the
decision in this case runs counter to it!! Id. at 618.
The issue has been further complicated by Ker v.
California, 374 U.S. 23 (1963), which authorized a
search of an apartment incident to an arrest therein,
but avoided relying upon Rabinowitz. "The practicability of obtaining a warrant is not the controlling factor
when a search is sought to be justified as incident to
arrest ... but we need not rest the validity of the
search here on Rabinowitz, since ... time clearly was of
the essence.... Thus the facts bear no resemblance to
those in Trupiano v. United States... where federal
agents for three weeks had been in possession of knowledge
sufficient to secure a search warrant." Id. at 41-42.
74
An attempt has been made to find an absolute
equation between reasonableness and the existence of a
warrant in the Trupiano rule. "A valid warrant was a
sine qua non of the reasonableness of a search. Thus
vehicle search and search incident to arrest were exceptions not only to the warrant requirement. They
were exceptions to the amendment itself,' Note, Search
and Seizure in the Supreme Court: Shadows on the
FourthAmendment, 28 U. Cmt. L. R.v. 664, 683 (1961).
This position seems to result from a reading of
Trupiano as always requiring a warrant and a disregard
of the decision in Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S.
132, 147 (1925): "The Fourth Amendment does not
denounce all searches or seizures, but only such as are
unreasonable."
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of securing a warrant wherever practicable, the
answer was plain. "The authority of officers to
search one's house or place of business contemporaneously with his lawful arrest therein upon a
valid warrant of arrest certainly is not greater
than that conferred by a search warrant .... ,
The implication of this statement cannot be mistaken; in order for a search to be reasonable within
the first clause of the amendment, it must comply
with the requirements of a search conducted pursuant to a warrant insofar as they are applicable.
In support of this formulation, the motor vehicle
search cases imposed a strict requirement of probable cause to believe that particular objects subject
to seizure were concealed within the automobile
involved 6 Marrmo v. United States' ' is not to the
contrary. There, officers armed with a valid search
warrant obtained entrance to a speakeasy and arrested the proprietor. During the course of their
search for items particularly described in the warrant, they uncovered other incriminating matter 8
not specified in the warrant. Their seizure and subsequent use in evidence was upheld. Although the
Court used unfortunately broad language, 79 the
decision authorized nothing more than use of the
arrest as sanction for the seizure of an article found
during the course of a valid search under a warrant." This interpretation was clarified and the
75United States v. Lefkoitz, 285 U.S. 452, 464
(1932).
76
Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160 (1949);
Husty v. United States, 282 U.S. 694 (931); Carroll v.
United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925). "The measure of
legality of such a seizure is, therefore, that the seizing
officer shall have reasonable or probable cause for believing that the automobile which he stops and seizes
has contraband liquor therein which is being illegally
transported." Carroll v. United States, supra at 155-56.
7' 275 U.S. 192 (1927).
75
The objects seized were books and ledgers which
the Court characterized as "part of the outfit or equipment actually used to commit the offense." Id. at 199.
Books and papers of mere evidentiary value are not a
proper subject of search and seizure under any circumstances, however reasonable. Gouled v. United States,
255 U.S. 298 (1921).
79"The officers were authorized to arrest for crime
being committed in their presence, and they lawfully
arrested Birdsall. They had a right without a warrant
contemporaneously to search the place in order to find
and seize the things used to carry on the criminal enterprise." 275 U.S. at 198-99.
80"When an article subject to lawful seizure properly
comes into an officer's possession in the course of a lawful search it would be entirely without reason to say that
he must return it because it was not one of the things it
was his business to look for." Abel v. United States, 362
U.S. 217, 238 (1960).
It should be noted, however, that the mere fact that
the object was lawfully discovered may not be enough.
The Court, in Marron, seemingly rejected the suggestion

doctrine of equivalence between the first and
second clauses of the amendment strengthened
by the later cases of Go-Bart Importing Co. v.
2
United States"' and United States v. Lefkowitz,8
which condemned general exploratory searches
incident to arrest and clearly indicated that the
reasonableness clause of the Fourth Amendment
could not be used to authorize a search for which
a warrant would not have validly issued.' 3
At this point then, a reading of equivalence into
the relationship between the first and second
clauses of the Fourth Amendment would seem to
be constitutionally required. The only searches
without a warrant which had been upheld were
those of a motor vehicle where probable cause was
required and search of a person incident to a lawful arrest.8 5 The attempted use of an arrest to
authorize a general search of the premises, although
broadly supported by dicta, had been struck down
in its only actual tests."6
Moreover, search of the person incident to an
arrest is broadly justifiable on grounds of probable
causeY Since probable cause is a constitutional
requirement !or a valid arrest, s a search of the
person incident to such an arrest may reasonably
be justified in two ways. Such a limited search
may be considered part of the process of arrest, or
probable cause for the arrest may, in itself, be
probable cause to believe that articles subject to
seizure are in the arrested person's possession.
Each of these suggested rationales is both broader
and narrower in implications than the other.
The rationale that such a search is really subsumed within the concept of arrest was suggested
by Mr. Justice Jackson, dissenting in, Harris v.
United States. "Of course, a warrant to take a perthat things so found were subject to seizure solely on the
authority of the warrant itself. See United States v.
Scott, 149 F. Supp. 837 (D.D.C. 1957). But see Davis v.
United States, 328 U.S. 582 (1946); Zap v. United
States, 328 U.S. 624 (1946).
81282 U.S. 344 (1931).
82 285 U.S. 452 (1932).
13See note 75 supra and accompanying text.
8 Cases cited note 76 supra.
8
5In Agnello v. United States, 269 U.S. 20 (1925),
the Court reversed the conviction as to Agnello because
of property unlawfully taken from his home in his
absence. The conviction of the other defendants, however, based on a search of their persons and a seizure
of articles in plain view as incident to an arrest, was
affirmed.
86See notes 81 and 82 supra and accompanying text.
8In Agnello v. United States, 269 U.S. 20 (1925),
there was clear]y probable cause since the officers had
watched the sale of narcotics through a window.
H Cases cited note 8 supra.
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son into custody is authority for taking into
custody all that is found upon his person or in his
hands."8 9 Under this formulation it would seem to
follow automatically that a right to search the
person exists in all cases regardless of the nature of
the offense.9 0 To this extent the power may seem
unnecessarily broad, yet its necessity is readily
apparent It is granted in order to properly effectuate the arrest; the -purpose is to protect the arresting officer. Even in the case of a minor violation it
does not seem unreasonable to allow the officer to
protect himself against a reasonable possibility
that the person arrested is, in fact, a man of more
violent disposition.
Basing the right of the search on the theory that
there exists probable cause to believe that articles
subject to seizure are in the person's possession
narrows the right of the search to the extent that
the nature of the crime for which the arrest takes
place becomes relevant. Thus, it would seem that,
under this rationale, arrests for offenses of a nature
which would not in themselves indicate the possession of a weapon or where fruits or instrumentalities are not involved, such as an arrest for a traffic
violation, would not be sufficient to authorize
even a search of the person."' The broadness of this
rationale becomes apparent, however, when its
implications in extending the area of permissible
search are considered. If the search is allowed only
for the purposes of effectuating the arrest it may
extend only to the person and those things within
his immediate physical control. If, however, the
rationale is that probable cause exists to believe
that articles subject to seizure are in his possession,
no such automatic limitation exists and extension
of the search to the premises becomes permissibleY
Only in this manner can the searches in Harris v.
331 U.S. 145, 196 (1947).
There would be no question about the presence of
probable cause. Going further, however, if the search is
clearly unnecessary on the facts of the particular case, it
might be held "unreasonable" under all the circumstances.
90

91 Cf. Brinegar v. State, 97 Okla. Grim. 299, 262
P.2d 464 (1953); Note, Search and Seizure-Search

Incident to Arrest for Traffic Violation, 1959 Wis. L.
Rzv. 347; 18 C.iAUp. L. REv. 673 (1930).
92This is not to say, however, that a line cannot be
drawn. Mr. Justice Frankfurter, dissenting in Rabinowitz, recognized the right to search the person as springing from two purposes: first, to protect the officer, and
second, to prevent the destruction of evidence by the
arrestee. 339 U.S. at 72.
Such a line, however, is not relevant to an underlying
rationale of probable cause. Compare Miller v. United
States, 357 U.S. 301 (1958).
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United States93 and United States v. Rabinowitz9 be

justified. In both cases the search, extended over
the entire premises in which the arrest took place, 95
and no question of necessity for protection or to
prevent escape was involved. Because of the broad
scope of the search in these casesi they have been
read as authorizing general exploratory searches, 6
which would not be allowed if therequiremaent of a
warrant were imposed. As imight be -expected, the
Court was urged to declare. the ,searches in both
cases invalid on the authority of Go-BartImporting
Co. v. United States and United States v. Lefkoibitz. s In Rabinowitz, theCourt said, howqyer, that
they were distinguishable. "Those cases condemned
general exploratory searches, which cannot be
undertaken: by officers with orwithout a warrant.
In the instant case the search was not general or
exploratory for whatever might cbe turned up.
Specificity was the =mark of the search and seizure
here." 99 It is submitted that insofar as ,Go-Bart and
Lefkowitz rest on the prohibition of, a general exploratory search' 1they were. appropoately distinguished from both Harris and ,Rabnowitz. In
eliciting a requirement of equivalence between the
first and second clauses of the amendment, the
basic test must be whether at the time the search
331 U.S. 145 (1946).
339 U.S. 56 (1950).
95In Harris,the defendant was arrested' in his fourroom apartment which was then -subjected to a fivehour search. The basis of the conviction was false
draft cards found in a sealed envelope in a bureau
drawer.
In Rabinowitz,the arrest took placein the defendant's
one-room office. The desk, safe, and file cabinets were
searched.
then
9
1E.g., Mr. Justice Murphy dissenting in Harris:
"This decision converts a warrant for arrest into a
general search warrant lacking all the constitutional
safeguards. . . ." 331 U.S. at 183.
282 U.S. 344 (1931).

- 285 U.S. 452 (1932).
91339 U.S. at 62.
100It is extremely difficult to determine, the precise
grounds of these cases. Lefkowitz, although regularly
cited as a holding against exploratory searches, seems
more concerned with enforcing the prohibition of
Gouled v. United States, 255 U.S. 298 (1921), that
papers of mere evidentiary value are never the subject
of a valid search and seizure.
Go-Bart seems more directly to challenge the exploratory nature of the search. Yet the Court alluded to the
opportunity to get a warrant and the failure to do so
as a ground for the decision. Furthermore, the conduct
of the officers may have been considered "unreasonable"
under all of the circumstances. The officers, (a) told
the defendants they had a search warrant when they
did not, and (b) arrested the defendants under color of
what was, in fact, an invalid warrant.of arrest. (The
Court purported to consider the arrests as having been
lawfully made without a warrant for purposes of determining the legality of the search.)
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began the officers could have obtained a valid
search warrant with the information they then
possessed."' It seems clear that warrants would
have issued for the search of both the apartment in
Harrisand the office in Rabinowitz had the officers
applied for them. In Harris,the defendant was arrested for check forgery and the search was for
instrumentalities of that crime. Since warrants
for the search of his office and car had, in fact, issued on allegations of the crime and his control
over these places,' ° ' the conclusion seems inescapable that a warrant would similarly have issued
for the search of the apartment. Similar facts
existed in Rabinowitz, where the arrest was for
possession and sale of postage stamps bearing
forged overprints. Throughout the opinion the
Court emphasized the strength of the evidence that
the stamps would probably be found in the defendant's office,'1 3 and Mr. Justice Frankfurter in
his dissent clearly implies that a search warrant
would have lawfully issued.'1
Thus it would seem accurate to say that the
Court, in judging the reasonableness of a search
without a warrant under the first clause of the
Fourth Amendment, has impliedly held that an
indispensable element of that reasonableness is
conformance, so far as applicable, with the specific
requirements imposed upon the issuance of a warrant under the second clause."0 5 In addition, all
101This is not, of course, the only aspect of equivalence involved. Quite apart from the question of probable cause, all searches must be conducted reasonably.
See United States v. Costner, 153 F.2d 23 (6th Cir.
1940). It would seem arguable that searches conducted
without the prior sanction of a magistrate should be
required to conform to even higher standards in this
regard. See United States v. Lefkowitz, 285 U.S. 452
(1932); Go-Bart Importing Co. v. United States, 282
U.S. 344 (1931).
102 Record, pp. 28-32.
103"There was probable cause to believe that respondent was conducting his business illegally. The
search was for stamps overprinted illegally which were
thought upon the most reliable information to be in the
possession of and concealed by respondent in the very
room where he was arrested, over which room he had
immediate control and in which he had been selling
such stamps unlawfully." 339 U.S. at 62-63.
Io4 The entire emphasis of his opinion is on the failure
to obtain a warrant. Although he never actually says
that probable cause for the search existed, the following
language strongly suggests it. "The arrest and search
were made on February 16, 1943. On February 1, there
was strong evidence that respondent had in his possession large numbers of stamps bearing forged overprints...." Thus, the government had at least seven,
and more accurately fifteen, days in which to procure
a search warrant. 331 U.S. at 85.
105Arguably, this may also be true of the cases sustaining administrative action without the requirement

searches, whether made with or without a warrant,
must be conducted reasonably in the sense of reasonableness under all the circumstances of the
particular case. To conclude thus from the abundance of cases construing the amendment in cases
of illegal searches, however, is but to pose the
problem; the applicability of this settled doctrine
to the law of arrest is yet to be considered.
III. ARRESTS WITH AND WITHOUT A WgARRANT

There has been little discussion concerning the
applicability of the standards imposed by the
Fourth Amendment to the law of arrest. 0 6 The
present absence of judicial development comparable to that in the search cases obviously creates
difficulties both in terms of analysis and of predictability. Other difficulties arise from the expression of the amendment's protection in terms of
"seizure" rather than arrest. This, too, the courts
have left completely untouched. Despite the seeming use of "seizure" primarily as an aspect of a
preceding search, 1' 7 however, several cases have
held that the amendment's requirement of probable cause applies both to the issuance of a warrant of arrest'08 and to an arrest without a warof a judicial warrant. In Abel v. United States, 362

U.S. 217 (1960), the administrative arrest and search
were under the authority of a warrant issued by a higher
official. "It is to be remembered that an I.N.S. officer
may not arrest and search on his own. Application for
a warrant must be made to an independent responsible
officer, the District Director of the I.N.S., to whom a
prima facie case of deportability must be shown."
Id. at 236, 237. In Frank v. Maryland, 359 U.S. 360
(1959), the observation of a pile of "rodent feces mixed
with straw and trash and debris to approximately half
a ton" on the outside of the house clearly gave probable
cause for an inspection of the interior. But see Ohio
ex rd. Eaton v. Price, prob. juris. noted, 360 U.S. 264
(1959), aff'd nere. by an equally divided court, 364 U.S.
263 (1960) (separate opinion of Frankfurter, Clark,
Whittaker and Harlan, JJ., in 360 U.S. 264, applying
the principle of Frank v. Maryland in the absence of
probable cause).
106
The reasons for the present dearth of authority
are discussed in note 33 supra. A substantial increase
in judicial consideration of this problem will very
probably result from the decision in Wong Sun v.
United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963), which applied
the exclusionary rule to oral declarations made during
the course of an unconstitutional arrest.
107
See United States v. Eighteen Cases of Tuna Fish
5 F.2d 979 (W.D. Va. 1925). "The bald letter of the
amendment suggests that it was intended to apply
only to warrants which direct both search and seizure.
But at least as to warrants for the arrest of persons
charged with crime there seems no room for doubt that
the amendment applies."
103E.g., Giordenello v. United States, 357 U.S. 480
(1958); McGrain v. Daugherty, 273 U.S. 135 (1927);
Albrecht v. United States, 273 U.S. 1 (1927); West v.

RICHARD M. LEAGRE

rant. 09 Most of the cases which have held that the
Fourth Amendment requires probable cause for an
arrest without a warrant seem to assume equivalence between the first and second clauses without
really discussing the issue.un It would seem, however, that by analogy to the development of the
reasonableness clause in the search cases, such
holdings are clearly sound."' Yet it must be admitted that, even in cases involving the enforcement of the criminal law, there are significant
differences in emphasis between the law of search
and seizure and the law of arrest. With the exception of searches incident to a valid arrest, the
Court has strictly required issuance of a search
warrant whenever practicable. It is interesting to
note that the extensive searches authorized in
both Harris' and Rabinowntz"' were incident to
an arrest made under a warrant of arrest. Prior to
the recent decision in Ker v. California,'" which
authorized a similarly extensive search incident
to an arrest made without a warrant, there had
been some feeling that the decisions in Harris and
Rabinowitz may have turned upon the existence
of a warrant of arrest." 5 After Ker, the doctrine is,
Cabell, 153 U.S. 78 (1894); Ex parte Burford, 7 U.S.
(3 Cranch) 448 (1806).
"0 E.g., Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23 (1963); Wong
Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963); Rios v.
United States, 364 U.S. 253 (1960); Henry v. United
States, 361 U.S. 98 (1959); Draper v. United States,
358 U.S. 307 (1959); Wrightson v. United States,
222 F.2d 556 (D.C. Cir. 1955); Worthington v. United
States, 166 F.2d 557 (6th Cir. 1948).
"'However, in Wong Sun v. United States, 371
U.S. 471 (1963), the Court stated that it should be at
least as difficult for a police officer to act without a
warrant as it was for him to obtain the warrant in the
first instance. "Whether or not the requirements of
reliability and particularity of the information on which
an officer may act are more stringent where an arrest
warrant is absent, they surely cannot be less stringent
than where an arrest warrant is obtained." Id. at 479.
"I Foote, Safeguards in the Law of Arrest, 52 Nw.
U.L. REv. 16, 39 (1957). "If the search and seizure
cases are determinative of the question, therefore, it
seems almost certain that a congressional enactment of
the Uniform Arrest Act would be found unconstitutional under the Fourth Amendment."
' 331 U.S. 145 (1947).

339 U.S. 56 (1950).
114 374 U.S. 23 (1963).
"' Abel v. United States, 362 U.S. 217, 249 (1960)
(dissenting opinion of Brennan, J.). "It thus could be
held that sufficient protection was given the individual
without the execution of a second warrant for the
search." Lower courts have not, however, so limited the
doctrine. E.g., Smith v. United States, 254 F.2d 751
(D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 357 U.S. 937 (1958); Bartlett v.
United States, 232 F.2d 135 (5th Cir. 1956).
Searches of the person are, of course, allowed whether
the arrest is with or without a warrant. E.g., Draper v.
11
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of course, not so limited. However, there are intimations that a showing that it was impracticable
to obtain a warrant may be required to justify
such searches based upon arrests without warrants." 6 Little discussion of a comparable protection for the security of the person against arrests
without warrant has been found. In Draper v.
United States,"7 for example, the Court upheld an
arrest without warrant for a narcotics violation in
the absence of any showing that it was impracticable to obtain one."' Indeed, lower courts have
affirmatively held that an arrest may be made
without a warrant even though abundant opportunity existed for its issuance. "If an arresting
officer has reasonable grounds to believe that a
person has violated the narcotic laws, he may defer
the arrest for a day, a week, two weeks, or perhaps
longer.""' 9 Such holdings may be based on a misconception of the common law rules which permitted arrests without warrant only for breaches of
the peace and felonies.120 Most of the discussion of

the right to arrest without warrant has centered
United States, 358 U.S. 307 (1959); Agnello v. United
States, 269 U.S. 20 (1925).
116 See note 73 supra.
117 358 U.S. 307 (1959).
1 In his dissent in Draper, however, Mr. Justice
Douglas intimated that such a limitation may exist.
"The rule which permits arrest for felonies, as distinguished from misdemeanors, if there are reasonable
grounds for believing a crime has been or is being
committed ... grew out of the need to protect the

public safety by making prompt arrests.... Yet, apart
from those cases where the crime is committed in the
presence of the officer, arrests without warrants, like
searches without warrants, are the exception, not the
rule in our society." 358 U.S. at 315-16. In his separate
opinion in Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471,
479 (1963), Mr. Justice Douglas clarified his earlier
statement by concurring solely on the ground that
"nothing the Court holds is inconsistent with my
belief that there having been time to get a warrant,
probable cause alone could not have justified the
arrest.., without a warrant." The majority opinion,
while not specifically alluding to the question, isconsistent with this position. "The arrest warrant procedure serves to insure that the deliberate impartial
judgment of a judicial officer will be interposed between
the citizen and the police ...." Id. at 481-82. See also

Smith v. United States, 254 F.2d 751, 759 (D.C. Cir.),
cert. denied, 357 U.S. 937 (1958) (dissenting opinion
of Bazelon, J.).
"9 Dailey v. United States, 261 F.2d 870, 872 (5th
Cir.), cert. denied, 359 U.S. 969 (1959) (arrest deferred
two weeks). A similar holding was made sub silentio in
Smith v. United States, 254 F.2d 751 (D.C. Cir.),
cert. denied, 357 U.S. 937 (1958). See also Mills v.
United States, 196 F.2d 600 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied,
344 U.S. 826 (1952) (semble).
12"
The common law rules are well summarized in 1
STEPEN, A HISTORY OF THE CaiJiNAL LAW oF
ENGLAND 193 (1883).
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around the highly involved distinctions in these
categories,"' and it seems to have been assumed
that no obligation to obtain a warrant exists"- ' if
the arrest is for a felony. 29 It does not necessarily
follow, however, that this is the case; the mere
grant of authority to arrest for certain crimes does
not automatically indicate that opportunity to
obtain a warrant is irrelevant."4 Early common law
authority would seem to indicate that an arrest
warrant was to be procured unless the delay would
afford opportunity for the suspected felon to
escape." 5
At any rate, it would not seem necessary to impose this requirement as a matter of Fourth
Amendment philosophy whatever the state of the
common law. Such a requirement, as in the search
cases, could only exist through a negative implication from the second clause of the amendment, and
the policy reasons underlying it there are not
necessarily applicable to the same extent in the
law of arrest. The justification for requiring a
warrant for the search of a house has both historical and practical bases. Most of the legal discussion of the amendment has emphasized the
privacy of the home as most inviolable 26 "At the
very core [of the Fourth Amendmentl. . . stands
the right of a man to retreat into his own home
and there be free from unreasonable governmental
intrusion."' - This historical emphasis upon the
sanctity of the home is not present in the normal
"11Wilgus, Arrest Without a Warrant, 22 M[IcH. L.
REv. 541 (1924).
22'MAcILEN, ARREST §§15, 21 (1950).
2 An arrest without warrant for a breach of the
peace had to be made immediately or on fresh pursuit.
Perkins, The Law of Arrest, 25 IowA L. REv. 201, 247
(1940).
"2 For discussion of a related problem in the search
cases, see note 74 supra and accompanying text.
"-In discussing the power of private persons to
arrest for a felony, Hale stated that "it is best to complain to a justice of peace, and have his warrant. . . but
such the case may be, that the delay that must arise
necessarily by these solemnities, may give the felon
opportunity to escape; and therefore in this case A.
without any other authority than what the law gives
him, may arrest or apprehend the felon ...
." 2 HAI=,
PLEAS OF T=n CROWN 76 (1st am. ed. 1847). Hawkins
later stated that it was difficult to find any greater
power in a constable to arrest for felonies than in a
private person. 2 HAWKINS, PLEAS OF THE CROWN 129
th ed. 1824).
126Fraenkel, Concerning Searches and Seizures, 34
HARv. L. Rnv. 361, 365 (1921). "It is, therefore, apparent that the Fourth Amendment did but embody a
principle of English liberty.., that finds another expression in the maxim 'every man's home is his castle'."
127 Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 511
(1961).

process of arrest."2 Moreover, the element of mobility, relied upon to justify dispensation with the
requirement of a warrant in the automobile search
cases," 9 is continually present in connection with
the normal arrest. Clearly, if the commission of
the felony is substantially contemporaneous with
the arrest, necessity in the traditional sense exists.
Not only is there no public policy in allowing felons
to go free while the officer is securing a warrant,
there is also no justification for a requirement
which may result in his ultimate escape. It can
hardly be denied, however, that. reasonable police
practice may indicate the desirability of postponing an arrest in particular situations. Often, it will
be far from clear whether adequate grounds for an
arrest exist; in other cases postponing the arrest
of an individual may be necessary in order to apprehend other members of a criminal organization.
Yet such delay may itself create a necessity for
prompt action at a particular time. To the extent
that this delay is recognized as a proper element of
police discretion it is apparent that arrests without warrant in such cases should be allowed. Beyond this it is difficult in principle to justify cases
where grounds for arrest clearly existed at an
earlier time and there was no element of potential
escape present.3 0 The difficulties presented in
determining whether such was the case, however,
should counsel restraint in concluding that an
officer acted unreasonably in failing to procure a
warrant although it may later appear that ample
opportunity existed for its issuance."'
To recognize that the Fourth Amendment does
not require a warrant of arrest whenever practicable, however, is not to indicate the lack of
equivalence between the requirements for an arrest with or without a warrant. Although a strong
insistence upon the issuance of a warrant lends
itself more readily to a requirement of equivalence,
"$To the extent that an arrest without warrant is
used to authorize an extensive search of a home, however, these considerations would not seem applicable
and some requirement of necessity should be imposed.
Compare Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23 (1963), with
Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963).
12 See note 65 supra.
130See cases cited note 119 supra.
M It would seem to follow a fortiori that the right
to arrest without warrant for lesser offences than
felonies and breaches of the peace is constitutionally
permissible. Foote, Safeguards in the Law of Arrest,
52 Nw. U. L. Rav. 16, 17-18 (1957). But see Wilgus,
Arrest Without Warrant, 22 Micn. L. Rxv. 541, 550
(1924). Such legislation for minor thefts is drastically
needed. See Note, Shoplifting and the Law of Arrest:
The Merchant's Dilennia,62 YALE L.J. 788 (1953).
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it is not a necessary prerequisite as the cases
authorizing search incident to an arrest make
dear.132 At any rate, in the .few arrest cases to
reach it, the Court has clearly held that reasonableness for an arrest without warrant requires the
same degree of probable cause as is necessary for
the issuance of a warrant. 13 Thus in Henry v.
United States,13 in construing the statutory grant
of authority allowing FBI agents to arrest without
warrant when they have "reasonable grounds to
believe,'

35

the Court said: "The statute states the

constitutional standard for it is the command of
the Fourth Amendment that no warrants for
either searches or arrests shall issue except 'upon
probable cause ....

'" 13

Two other cases fortify

this requirement of equivalence and further illustrate the extent of interrelationship between the
search and arrest cases. In Draperv. United States"
the Court held that probable cause for an arrest
without warrant could be based on information of
a hearsay nature. The decision was interpreted by
Mr. Justice Douglas, dissenting, as "lowering the
standard when an arrest is made without a warrant and allowing the officers more leeway than we
grant the magistrate."' 3 In Jones v. United States,
the Court clarified the situation by holding that
hearsay could be the basis for a search warrant on
the authority of Draper. "If an officer may act
upon probable cause without a warrant when the
only incriminating evidence in his possession is
hearsay, it would be incongruous to hold that such
evidence presented in an affidavit is insufficient
basis for a warrant."' 139 Most recently, the Court in
132 See text accompanying note 93 supra.
133 There exists a strong likelihood, however, that
probable cause in the traditional sense will not be
required for an administrative arrest. See Abel v. United
States, 362 U.S. 217 (1960) (validity of arrest not
specifically decided due to concession in the lower
courts).
1- 361 U.S. 98 (1959).
13518 U.S.C. §3052 (1958).

361 U.S. at 100.
1"358 U.S. 307 (1959).
" Id. at 325.
1- 362 U.S. 257, 270 (1960). It should be noted that
the use of hearsay as the basis for a search or an arrest,
when considered in conjunction with the governmental
privilege not to disclose the identity of an informer,
may create significant problems. In Jones, the Court,
with some qualifications, authorized the use of such
information to establish probable cause for the issuance
of a search warrant. To the extent that nondisclosure of
identity is allowed, it is apparent that there is a possibility that the alleged hearsay information may exist
only in the officer's mind. This possibility becomes substantially more dangerous if such information is subsequently used to justify a search or an arrest previously
made without a warrant. Assuming the validity of the
136
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Wong Sun v.United States'40 dearly held that an
arrest without a warrant could be justified only if
the information upon which the officers acted
would have been sufficient to justify the issuance of
an arrest warrant.
Thus it is clear from both the search and arrest
cases that the Fourth Amendment applies the
standard of probable cause to determine the
validity of an arrest made without a warrant. In
the face of these decisions, attempts to authorize
arrests on lesser grounds would seem to be assured
of invalidity. Yet the right to "arrest" and the
right to "detain" are not necessarily synonymous;
just as "unreasonable" in the Fourth Amendment
is a word of art due to its equivalence with the
requirements for the issuance of a warrant, so also
is the term "arrest."
IV. TnE RiGHT or TMPORARY

DETENTION

A. The Basisfor the Distinction Between "Arrest'"
and "Detention"
A doctrine of equivalence between the first and
second dauses of the amendment is necessarily
based upon a fundamental notion that an officer
should not be allowed to act without a warrant in
situations where a warrant would not validly
issue. Where the nature of the activity is not
encompassed within the situations to which a
warrant is applicable, however, as in the administrative search cases, 4' the reason for the rule fails
and with it the rule. The right of temporary detention must rest on similar grounds; it must be established that it is different in kind from those
situations to which a warrant is applicable and
that, hence, no requirement of probable cause is to
be implied. Certain kinds of official detention
dearly satisfy this test. Thus it is not difficult to
recognize that detention of an insane person or of a
lost child or the enforcement of quarantine measures do not require a showing of probable cause;
in such a context, the concept of probable cause in
informer's privilege, it would seem questionable whether
such information from a privileged source should be
considered in determining the existence of probable
cause.
140
371 U.S. 471 (1963).
'41 The most logical interpretation of Abel v. United
States, 362 U.S. 217 (1960), and especially Frank v.
Maryland, 359 U.S. 360 (1959), is that the searches
there upheld are different in kind from searches for
which a warrant, and hence probable cause, is required.
Reasonableness in a distinguishable context takes on a
different meaning. Cf. Oklahoma Press Publishing Co.
v. Walling, 327 U.S. 186 (1946) (probable cause not
required for the issuance of a subpoena duces tecum).
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the traditional sense is not applicable. Other examples in the same general category include the
right to detain a witness at the scene of a crime
or a material witness who may not remain available to testify"2 and the authority of a police
officer to stop an automobile for the purpose
of inspecting the operator's license.' Whether
some or all of these restraints on liberty should be
allowed is a question which can only be answered
by a weighing of relative values; that they are
different from an arrest for a crime cannot be
denied.
Such examples, however, do not substantiate the
existence of a similar right of detention for the
purposes of enforcement of the criminal law. If
the line is to be drawn at an invasion of privacy
"which has as its design the securing of information ... which may be used to effect a further

deprivation of life or liberty or property, ' " it
would seem difficult to consider detention of a
suspect as differing from an arrest to the degree
that constitutional differentiation is warranted.
Yet the distinction may be implied from the
amendment itself. The Fourth Amendment does
not in terms refer to "arrest"; 415 it does, however,
in its second clause impose the traditional qualifications of an arrest upon the issuance of a warrant.1 46 Thus the argument can be made that the
warrant referred to is the traditional warrant of
142 2 ALEXANDER, ARREST 2029-2037 (1949); Perkins,

The Law of Arrest, 25 IOWA L. REv. 201, 258-59 (1940).
143 E.g., City of Miami v. Aronovitz, 114 So. 2d 784
(Fla. 1959). Of course, such authority cannot be used
as a subterfuge for an invalid purpose. Robertson v.
State, 184 Tenn. 277, 198 S.W.2d 633 (1947).
144 Frank v. Maryland, 359 U.S. 360, 365 (1959).
145"The right of the people to be securein theirpersons,
houses, papers, and effects, againstunreasonablesearches
and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants
shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by
Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the
place to be searched, and the persons or things to be
seized. U.S. CoNsT. amend. IV. (Emphasis added.)

146 2 HAWKINS, PLEAS OF THE CROWN 134 (8th ed.
1824). "[A] justice of peace cannot well be too tender in
his proceedings of this kind, and seems to be punishable
not only at the suit of the king, but also of the party
grieved, if he grant any such warrant groundlessly and
maliciously, without such a probable cause as might
induce a candid and impartial man to suspect the party
to be guilty."
Hale had earlier indicated the requirement of an
oath. 2 HALE, PLEAS Or THE CROWN 110 (1st am. ed.
1847). "But that I may say it once for all, it is fit in all
cases of warrants for arresting for felony, much more
for suspicion of felony, to examine upon oath the party
requiring a warrant, as well whether a felony were done,
as also the causes of his suspicion, for he is in this case
a competent judge of those circumstances that may
induce the granting of a warrant to arrest."

arrest although "arrest" itself is not specifically
mentioned.147 If this is accepted, then whatever
equivalence that exists between the first and
second clauses of the amendment should be limited
to "arrests" even though other "seizures" may be
utilized as a preliminary step in the enforcement of
the criminal law. Thus, "reasonable" as a word of
art requiring the existence of probable cause is
applicable to arrests without warrants, but does
not apply to those seizures which fall short of con41
stituting an arrest.
Obviously, such an argument requires the existence of a valid distinction between "arrests" and
other "seizures" of the person in the context of the
criminal law. Although there is some authority that
any deprivation of liberty of movement is an
arrest,'" the generally accepted definition"1 ' at
common law is "the apprehending or restraining
of one's person, in order to be forthcoming to
answer an alleged or suspected crime.""' The key
words in this definition are, of course, those in the
qualifying phrase "in order to be forthcoming to
answer an alleged or suspected crime," and it must
be admitted that the meaning of this phrase is far
from clear. Its ambiguity can be resolved narrowly
by interpreting it merely to exclude those situations not involving the enforcement of the criminal
law, such as the detention of the insane. 13' Yet it
cannot be denied that a broader meaning has some147
Brief for United States, p. 30, Rios v. United
States, 364 U.S. 253 (1960). "Similarly, we think, the
'warrant' required by the Fourth Amendment to be
supported by probable cause was the traditional
warrant of arrest ......
148 "[H]ence that provision carries no implication
that probable cause is required for limited detentions
for inquiry that are less than a common law arrest."
Ibd.
14 E.g., United States v. Scott, 149 F. Supp. 837
(D.D.C. 1957); 1 ALEXANDER, ARREST 353-61 (1949).
But see, e.g., Perkins, The Tennessee Law of Arrest, 2
VAND. L. R-v. 509, 522 (1949). "[A]Ithough the word
'Arrest' is derived from origins which mean 'to stop',
and it is used in that sense for some other purposes,
the mere act of stopping a man does not constitute an
arrest as a matter of law."
110 A.L.I. CODE or CRIMNAL PROCEDURE §18 (Official
Draft 1930); see RESTATEMENT, TORTS §112 (1934);
109 U. PA. L. REv. 262 (1960).
M4 BLACKSTONE, COMIENTARIES *289, p. 1679
(1897 ed.).
12 Foote, The Fourth Amendment: Obstacle or Necessity in the Law of Arrest?, 51 J. Cpnr. L., C. & P.S. 402,
403 (1960). "The most reasonable interpretation of this
language would be that it merely distinguishes a restraint the purpose of which is related to the enforcement of the criminal law from the seizure of a lost child
in order to return it to its parents, the enforcement of
quarantine measures, or the detention of a mentally ill
person who requires care and treatment."
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times been given it, at least insofar as "apprehending or restraining" is defined as a temporary
interference with liberty of movement.- 3 The latter
interpretation, to the extent that it distinguishes
between those seizures which can appropriately
be termed "arrests" and those which can more
appropriately be considered as "detentions," is
necessarily adopted by those arguing for the right
to detain on lesser grounds of belief. It is fortified
by a reliance on the English common law, which
purported to recognize such a distinction under
certain circumstances. Both the Government'
and the draftsmen of the Uniform Arrest Act"5
rely heavily upon this common law distinction.
Such reliance would appear necessary for the purpose of interpreting the amendment; if the framers
are to be deemed to have distinguished between an
"arrest" and a "detention," it seems essential that
such a distinction contemporaneously existed.'
For this reason it is appropriate at this point to
consider the authorities relied upon in some detail.
B. The Source of the Distinwtion-The English
Authorities

Two propositions are sought to be elicited from
the early English common law: first, that a power
153Perkins, The Tennessee Law of Arrest, 2 VAzNi.

L. Rxv. 509, 522 (1949). "A man who has merely been
approached by an officer and questioned has been
'accosted' but not arrested; and stopping for questioning may be quite proper when an arrest would not
be authorized." It should be noted that in those cases
authorizing the search of a moving motor vehicle without warrant, e.g., Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S.
132 (1925), there was necessarily a detention although
there was not an arrest.
'54 Brief for United States, p. 26, Rios v. United
States, 364 U.S. 253 (1960); Brief for United States,
p. 138, United States v. Bufalino, 285 F.2d 408 (2d
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existed to "detain" on grounds less than probable
cause; and second, that the one detaining was not
required to proceed after the "detention" in the
same manner as was required after an "arrest." A
distinction must be drawn between "arrests" and
"detentions"; it is not enough merely to find that a
person could be arrested in the traditional sense on
grounds less than probable cause, because to that
extent the common law is repealed by the Fourth
Amendment. The failure to recognize this distinction has led some to argue that the arrest of an
actualfelon should be lawful per se"' because some
authority for it existed at common law.-'6 This
seems clearly unsound in view of the specific constitutional requirement of probable cause.' 59
There are a number of difficulties in determining
whether such a distinction between "arrests" and
"detentions" existed at common law. First of all,
the authorities chiefly8 ° relied upon, Hale 8 ' and
Hawkins, 6 ' do not so neatly categorize the matter;
they tend to refer to everything as an "arrest."
This should not, however, foreclose the issue; as
mentioned before, the distinction rests rather in the
totality of the process. The second problem involved in interpreting these writings is the free
and easy use made of the term "suspicious." At
various points in their discussion of the law of
arrest, both writers seemingly use "suspicion,"
"probable cause for suspicion," and "just suspicion" interchangeably. The use of "suspicion"
rather than "belief" is not in itself important;
modem writers continue to refer to the authority
to arrest as based on "reasonable suspicion" as a
synonym for "reasonable belief." 16 The difficulty
157E.g., Bruce & Rosmarin, The Gunman and His

ir.), reLversing on other grounds, United States v.

Gun, 24 J. Ciu. L. & C. 521 (1933-1934); Waite,

Rxv.

R-v. 749 (1933); Section 6(2) of the Uniform Arrest
Act in Warner, The Uniform Arrest Act, 28 VA. L. REV.
315, 345 (1942); Comment, 3 U.C.L.A.L. REv. 55
(1955-1956). Existing statutes in several states and
§21(b) of the American Law Institute's Code of Criminal Procedure (official draft 1930) are literally capable
of such a reading. No case, however, has so held. Note,

Bonanno, 180 F. Supp. 71 (S.D.N.Y. 1960).

155Warner, The Uniform Arrest Act, 28 VA. L.

315, 318 (1942).
156 Cases such as Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S.
10 (1948), and United States v. Di Re, 332 U.S. 581
(1947), which hold that in the absence of a federal
statute state law governs the validity of an arrest
without warrant, should not be confused. Such rulings
merely require additional conformance with the law
of the state wherein the arrest takes place; they do not,
however, justify a lowering of the minimum constitutional standards. Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23 (1963);
West v. Cabell, 153 U.S. 78 (1894); Burks v. United
States, 287 F.2d 117 (9th Cir. 1961); Marsh v. United
States, 29 F.2d 172 (1928), cert. denied, 279 U.S. 84
(1929). Thus the existence of a provision such as the
Uniform Arrest Act could have no effect upon the
constitutional requirements imposed by the Fourth
Amendment. See 36 NOTRE D ss LAw. 432 (19601961); 109 U. PA. L. REv. 262 (1960). But see United
States v. Bonanno, 180 F. Supp. 71 (S.D.N.Y.), rev'd
on other grounds sub nom. United States v. Bufalino,

285 F.2d 408 (2d Cir. 1960).

Public Policy and the Arrest of Felons, 31 Micro L.

24 TEm. L. Rav. 258 (1956).
",8
2 HALE, PLEAS oF TH CROWN 78 (1st am. ed.
1947). See Perkins, The Tennessee Law of Arrest, 2
VAND.L. REV.509, 571 (1949).

"59If this were not true in the area of search and
seizure, the exclusionary rule would be inapplicable in
all cases except where papers of merely evidentiary
value were involved under the rule of Gouled v. United
States, 255 U.S. 298 (1921). See, e.g., United States v.
Di Re, 332 U.S. 581 (1947).
160
See also 4 BLACKSTONE, Co--reNTAnms *292,
pp. 1683, 1684 (1897 ed.).
M HALE, PLEAS Or THE CROWN (1st am. ed. 1847).
16 HAWkiNs, PLaAs or Tm CRowN (8th ed. 1824).
" E.g., Perkins, The Law of Arrest, 25 IOWA L.

THE FOURTH AMENDMENT AND THE LAW OF ARREST

lies rather in the implications to be drawn from
the absence of a prefix like "just," "probable,"
or "reasonable." Thus Hale, in discussing the
powers of constables, states:
"The constable may arrest suspicious nightwalkers by the statute of 5E.3 cap. 14. and men
that ride armed in fair or markets or elsewhere.
Stat., 2E.3, cap. 3. de Northampton.
"And it appears by the books before-mentioned, that in cases of arrests of this or the like
nature, the constable may execute his office upon
information and request of others, that suspect
and charge the offenders, nay tho it be but with
suspicion thereof."16 4
Taken out of context, this statement implies that a
lesser ground of suspicion is sufficient authority
for an arrest under certain circumstances. Yet it is
clear that Hale was not attempting to draw any
such distinction; the context in which the statement was made was that of a discussion of those
situations in which it was appropriate for the
officer to act without first obtaining a warrant' 6 5
He begins this discussion by saying.
"By the original and inherent power in the
constable he may for breach of the peace and
some misdemeanors, less than felony, imprison
a person."' 6
He then goes on to consider those situations less
than felonies, of which a "suspicious night-walker"
is one, in which such an arrest was authorized.
The other area in which reference is made to
"night-walkers" is in the discussion of the powers
of watchmen. There were three kinds of watchmen,
and Hale discusses them in order. The first kind
are those specially appointed to keep watch in all
towns during the night. Of them Hale says:
"Their power is to arrest such as pass by until
the morning, and if no suspicion, they are then
to be delivered, and if suspicion be touching
them, they shall be delivered to the sheriff,
RFv. 201 (1940). See De Salvatore v. State, 163 A.2d
244 (Del. 1960).
M 2 HAi., PLEAS or TH CROwx 89 (1st am. ed.
1847).
265 Indeed, in a footnote to the "suspicious nightwalker" passage by the editor, the ambiguity is clarified.
"But then that suspicion must not be a mere causeless
suspicion, but must be founded upon some probable
reason; and so it was ruled in the case of the Queen
and Tooley.... [Chief Justice Holt said] that of late,
constables made a practice of taking up people only
for walking the streets, but he knew not whence they
had the authority." Id. at 89, n.(f).
166 Id. at 88.

viz. to the common gaol, there to remain until
they be in due manner delivered .... "1
Since this watch extended only between Ascension
day and Michaelmas, the constable was given the
power to keep another watch in order to carry
out his functions, one of which was, of course, to
arrest those who went armed and night-walkers. 16
The third kind of watch was similar to the second
but appointed by justices of the peace rather than
constables. This watch had the same power as the
other two. 69 Here, again, Hale states:
"And such a watchman may apprehend nightwalkers and commit them to custody till the
morning, and also felons and persons suspected
of felony."'7 0
The ambiguity of the passages in relation to the
degree of suspicion is especially apparent at this
point. Here, Hale refers only to "night-walkers,"
without even bothering to designate them as
"suspicious." A possible interpretation of this
would be that "night-walkers" were subject to
arrest whether or not probable cause or even mere
suspicion existed. Yet in discussing the watch kept
by the constables, he also refers to "persons suspicious either by night or day."' 7' Furthermore,
reading the passage in light of his general discussion of the powers of peace officers, it would appear
that a "night-walker" was, ex hypothesi, a "suspicious night-walker." In referring to the powers of
all peace officers in an earlier passage, Hale had
said:
"And hence it is, that these officers, that are
thus intrusted, may without any other warrant
but from themselves arrest felons, and those
that are probably suspected of felonies.., nay
for breach of the peace or just suspicion thereof,
as nightwalkers, persons unduly armed ....,2
It must be admitted however, that this is not entirely clear as to watchmen. If a watchman is to
free those whom no suspicion "be touching" in
the morning, then it would seem that suspicion
was not necessary for the arrest during the night.
The case of the "suspicious night-walker" was
also given consideration by Hawkins in discussing
17 Id. at 96.
168See text accompanying note 164 supra. In addition to "night-walkers" Hale mentions "persons suspicious either by night or day." The statutory
authorization for this is the same as for the power of
constables to arrest night-walkers. Id. at 96-97.
10 Id.at 97.
170
Ibid.
171See note 168 supra.
172
Id. at 84-85.
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the power of both private citizensu3 and peace
officers to arrest without warrant. As to such
power in a private person, he first lists six "sufficient causes" upon which to base an arrest for a
felony 74 The implication that reasonable grounds
must be shown is more clearly expressed in a later
passage as follows:
"It seems to be certain, that whoever would
justify the arrest of an innocent person by reason
of any such suspicion, must not only shew that
he suspected the party himself, but must also
set forth the cause which induced him to have
such a suspicion, that it may appear to the court
to have been a sufficient ground for his proceed-

ing.,YY75

Then on the same page, he moves from the consideration of felonies to lesser offenses and changes
the discussion from the degree of suspicion to the
nature of the offense.
"As to the arrest of offenders by private persons of their own authority, permitted by law for
inferior offences, it seems clear, that regularly no
private person can of his own authority arrest
another for a bare breach of the peace after it is
over; for if an officer cannot justify such an arrest without a warrant from a magistrate, surely
a fortiori a private person cannot. Yet it is
holden by some, that any private person may
lawfully arrest a suspicious night-walker, and
detain him till he makes it appear that he is a
person of good reputation. Also it hath been
adjudged, that any one may apprehend a common notorious cheat going about the country
with false dice, and being actually caught playing with them, in order to have him before a
justice of peace, for the public good requires the
utmost discouragement of all such persons; and
the restraining of private persons from arresting
them without a warrant from a magistrate,
would often give them an opportunity of escaping. And from the reason of this case it seems to
follow, that the arrest of any other offenders by
private persons, for offences in like manner
scandalous and prejudicial to the public, may be
justified."' 176
From the full statement it clearly appears that
Hawkins was not attempting to distinguish between the necessary degrees of suspicion; like Hale
173 Hale does not discuss the power of private persons
to arrest night-walkers. Id. at 72-84.
1742 HAWKINS, PLEAS OF THE CROWN 118 (8th ed.
1824).
17 Id. at 120.
176 Id. at 120-21.
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he was merely categorizing those situations in
which an arrest not made by authority of a warrant was permissible. Furthermore, the reference
to "common notorious cheats" and "offences in
like manner scandalous and prejudicial to the
public" in the same passage indicates that some
just cause of suspicion was considered necessary.
Hawkins goes on in the next chapter to consider
this situation in relation to the power of watchmen.
In beginning the discussion of watchmen, he says:
"As to the power of watchmen, it is further
exacted by the said statute of Winchester, C. 4.
'that if any stranger do pass by the watch, he
shall be arrested until morning. And if no suspicion be found, he shall go quit; and if they find
cause of suspicion, they shall forthwith deliver
him to the sheriff and the sheriff may receive him
without damage, and shall keep him safely until
. , M
he be acquitted in due manner...
Again, as in the quotation from Hale, it seems
necessarily implied that no suspicion, probable or
otherwise, is required for such an arrest by the
terms of the statute. Yet Hawkins goes on to say:
"It is holden that this statute was made in
affirmance of the common law, and that every
private person may by the common law arrest
any suspicious night-walker, and detain him till
he give a good account of himself, as hath been
more fully shewn in the precedent chapter,
section twenty."'78
A further indication that the suspicion must be for
just cause is supplied in a later passage when he
states that this same statute implies the existence
of a similar power to arrest in bailiffs.
"And surely it cannot be doubted but that by
force hereof such bailiffs may lawfully arrest and
detain any such stranger, being found under
probable circumstances of suspicion, till he shall
give a good account of himself."'7
Thus it can hardly be said that a clear conclusion
can be reached from a consideration of these writings. Early judicial authority is similarly unclear.
In The Queen v. Tooley'80 the court rejected an
argument that the fact that a constable recognized
a girl as one he had previously arrested for disorderly conduct gave him sufficient grounds to
arrest her in the present case. 8
1771d. at 128.
178
Id. at 129. (Emphasis added.)
19Id. at 132. (Emphasis added.)
180
2 Ld Raym 1296, 92 Eng. Rep. 349 (KB 1709).
181 This argument was based on the Statute of Winchester, 1331, 5 Edw. 3, c. 14. This statute authorized
a constable to arrest suspicious night-walkers. See text
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"[I]t is not a constable's suspecting, that will
justify his taking up a person, but it must be
just grounds of suspicion.... [I]t would be
hard, that the liberty of the subject should depend on the will of the constable, and shall his
not liking a woman's looks be any cause of suspicion?"18
Yet in Lawrence v. Hedger,8 3 the court upheld a
detention in the most typical of what would be now
considered a "suspicious circumstances" case. The
plaintiff had been walking through the London
streets at ten o'clock in the evening when he was
stopped by a watchman; upon failure to satisfactorily explain himself he was taken to jail. The
next morning he was discharged. The court said
that the existence of such a power in watchmen
during the night was essential and that there were
sufficient grounds in the present case. "And, in this
case, what do you talk of groundless suspicion?
There was abundant ground of suspicion here. We
should be very sorry if the law were otherwise."' 14
From the authority considered it would seem at
least doubtful whether any lesser degree of suspicion for a detention other than an arrest was
clearly recognized at common law. Even if lesser
grounds were sufficient to arrest a night-walker,
it is clear that at least insofar as constables were
concerned, it implied no power to detain other
than through the ordinary process of arrest. 5'
However, the power of watchmen to detain nightwalkers until morning "and if no suspicion be
found, he shall go quit" seems necessarily to imply
both that a lesser standard than "probable cause"
was satisfactory and that taking them before a
justice or magistrate was not required. Yet it
should be recognized that this conclusion does not
inevitably follow. The right to detain a person
accompanying note 164 supra. It is very similar to the
Statute of Winchester, 1285, 13 Edw. 1, stat. 2, c. 4,
which authorized such arrests by watchmen. See text
accompanying note 177 supra.
182 2 Ld. Raym. at 1301, 92 Eng. Rep. at 352. See
also note 165 supra.
1833 Taunt. 13, 128 Eng. Rep. 6 (C.P. 1810).
84 3 Taunt at 15, 128 Eng. Rep. at 7. See also Rex v.
Bootie, 2 Burr 864, 97 Eng. Rep. 605 (KB 1759)
(dictum).
1852 HALE, PLEAS OF TrE CRowN 95 (1st am. ed.
1847). "I come now in the last place to consider what
the constable is to do with his prisoner that he hath
thus arrested for felony or other causes above-mentioned." He goes on to say that the constable may put
him in the stocks if intoxicated or take him to the sheriff
or to jail: "But the safest and best way in all cases, is
to bring them to a justice of peace, and by them the
prisoner may be bailed or committed, as the case shall
require .... " Ibid. (Emphasis added.)

until he gives a good account of himself or even to
commit him overnight can be squared with an
arrest based on probable cause. Although the
proposition is not universally accepted 8 ' there is
modern authority that an officer may release one
who was validly arrested if it becomes apparent
that a reasonable mistake has been made.136 Furthermore, there is authority both at common law 88
and at the present time 89 that the requirement of
prompt arraignment does not mean that a magistrate or justice of the peace must be awakened in
the middle of the night.
It must be admitted, however, that the power of
the watchmen went far beyond these limited privileges. Thus, it would seem highly arguable that,
under certain circumstances, a distinction between
"arrests" and other forms of "seizure" or "detention" existed at common law. To the extent that
this distinction is incorporated into the Fourth
Amendment, serious questions are raised as to its
proper safeguards and limitations.
C. The Nature of the Right-A New Definition of
"Cnreasonable"
1. The Initial Apprehension
One of the strongest arguments against allowing
detention on lesser grounds than are required to
justify an arrest is the difficulty involved in setting
new standards of reasonableness. "If probable
cause is no longer to be the test, at least at the
initial point of arrest, where is the line to be drawn
short of indiscriminate police detentions based on
hunch?"'8 0 Yet probable causel itself is not a
magic formula to be automatically applied to the
facts of a particular case. Although within the
context of the amendment probable cause must
require a uniform amount of pre-arrest information
in every case," implications are not lacking that
188 See

1 ALExAMDER, ARREsT 637-39 (1949).
187Perkins, The Law of Arrest, 25 IowA L. REv. 201,
254 (1940).
188Hale recognized that this power to detain existed
at night when the justice could not be reached. 2 HALE,
PLEAS OF THE CROWN 95, 119 (1st am. ed. 1847).
189See Mallory v. United States, 354 U.S. 449 (1957);
Perkins, supra note 187, at 257-58.
190
Foote, The Fourth Amendment: Obstacle or Necessity in the Law of Arrest?, 51 J.Cxns. L., C & P.S.
402, 407 (1960).
"'The traditional formulation of the law of arrest
is reasonable grounds to believe. The Court has equated
this with probable cause within the meaning of the
Fourth Amendment. Henry v. United States, 361 U.S.
98 (1959); Draper v. United States, 358 U.S. 307 (1959).
192Probable cause, in other words, must be inter-
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this standard has been relaxed in particular circumstances,02 and the recent decisions raising
hearsay information to constitutional respectability' indicate that the requisite belief need not
be created by information personally obtained
through contact with or observation of the person
to be arrested.'95 Even assuming the existence of a
consistent standard does not, however, aid in the
analysis of its content. It is apparent that no precise meanings can be attributed to words such as
"suspicion" and "belief" or their counterparts
when prefixed with "reasonable" or "probable";
the basis for a distinction can lie only in their relative meanings when subjected to a critical comparison. Only by first realizing that precision of
definition cannot be attained is it possible to avoid
these ambiguities and approach a satisfactory
analysis.
It would seem that two basic elements can be
distilled from the concept of probable cause. The
Court has said that "in dealing with probable
196
This
cause.. . we deal with probabilities."
statement may appear to be a truism, but it is
important in showing that no belief, however reasonable, is sufficient to satisfy the test if it merely
indicates the possibility and not the probability
that an individual has committed a crime. To this
preted to mean probable cause "to believe" that the
person to be arrested is guilty of a crime. Such an
interpretation is of the essence of a prohibition of
general warrants. But see Note, Search and Seizure in
the Supreme Court: Shadows on the Fourth Amendment,

28 U. Cm. L. Rav. 664, 680 n.93 (1961). "An alternative interpretation of the probable cause requirement
may have been left open to the Court by the wording
of the amendment. 'Probable cause' might be interpreted 'probable cause to issue.' Included in the notion
would be all the considerations relevant to the proper
issuance of the writ."
19 The basis for the officers' action in the automobile
search cases approached the very limit of probable
cause, as the court in Brinegar v. United States, 338
U.S. 160 (1949), admits.
'94 Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257 (1960);
Draper v. United States, 358 U.S. 307 (1959). See
Brinegar v. United States, supra note 193. Of course,
hearsay in the sense of second hand information supplied by the applicant, has always been sufficient to
create probable cause in the mind of the magistrate
issuing the warrant. See Note, Hearsay Evidence as a
Basis for Prosecution, Arrest and Search, 32 IND. L. J.
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extent, it seems to embody the specific requirements of particular description imposed by the
words of the amendment itself upon the issuance of
a warrant 1 7 and thus expresses the policy against
generality at which the amendment was primarily
directed. 9 s If a showing of probability is required,
a general warrant, by hypothesis, can never issue,
and mass arrests would be invalid.'99 From this
element of probable cause, a relative distinction
between the meanings conveyed by the terms
"suspicion" and "belief" 201 may be elicited. In such
a classification "suspicion" would lie generally in
the area of possibility and "belief" in that of
probability. Whatever the semantic difficulties
and the problems of borderline cases, such a distinction for purposes of analysis seems worthwhile.
On the assumption, then, that one of the elements of probable cause is that of probability as
distinguished from possibility, of "belief" as distinguished from "suspicion," the second basic
element remains to be considered. In the most
quoted definition of probable cause, the Court
asserted its existence if the information possessed
by the officers was sufficient "to warrant a man of
'2
reasonable caution in the belief" 1' that articles

subject to search and seizure were involved. It is
thus dear that the test of probable cause imposes
an objective, rather than a subjective, standard.
A mere good faith belief that an individual has
committed a crime or that objects subject to seizure
are within a house or car will not satisfy the test;
it must, in addition, be a reasonablebelief.22 In like
i97 U.S. CONST. amend. IV. "[A]nd no warrants
shall issue, but upon probable cause ...and particu-

larly describingthe place to be searched, and the persons
or things to be seized." (Emphasis added.)
's See text accompanying note 35 supra.
199Even here, however, a word of caution

must be
added. It is not clear that "probable" is to be interpreted to mean "more probable than not." If it is clear
that either A or B is solely guilty of a crime, does
probable cause to arrest either or both exist? For an
affirmative answer to this question but couched in
nonconstitutional terms, see Perkins, The Law of
Arrest, 25 IowA L. Rlv. 201, 238 (1940); REsTATxsENT,
ToRTs §119 (1934). It would seem clear, however, that
such an interpretation could not be extended to justify
mass arrests. Mallory v. United States, 354 U.S. 449,
456 (1957). But see Goldsmith v. United States, 277
F.2d 335 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Carter v.

United States, 364 U.S. 863 (1960).
209 Sections two and four of the Uniform Arrest Act
require "reasonable ground to believe" to justify an
arrest and "reasonable ground to suspect" to justify a
officer's inquiry. Barrett, Personal Rights, Property detention. Warner, The Uniform Arrest Act, 28 VA. L.
REv. 315, 343-47 (1942).
Rights, and the FourthAmendment, 1960 Sup. Cx. REv.
201 Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 162 (1925).
46, 65-70. See note 192 supra.
202 E.g., Henry v. United States, 361 U.S. 98, 102
196Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 175
(1959). "Probable cause exists if the facts and the dr(1949).
332 (1956-1957).
195
An argument has also been made that these cases
indicate a relaxation of the standard of probable cause
rather than merely increasing the relevant scope of the
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manner, an objective or subjective test can be applied to a "suspicion" or "possibility." To this
extent, a relative distinction can be drawn between a "reasonable suspicion" and a "mere suspicion or hunch."
With this analysis as a background, it is thus
possible to determine the variations of the standard
of probable cause which might serve as lesser
grounds for the authorization of a detention. If
probable cause under the prior analysis can be
defined as a reasonable belief in the probability
that a crime has been committed, the possible
variations would be as follows:
Possibility Number One-"Good Faith Belief."
In order for a detention to be valid, the condition
of the officer's mind must be such that he actually
believes that the person detained is probably
guilty of a crime. It is not necessary that other men
would reasonably have reached the same conclusion; it is only required that this particular officer
actually so believed. It is necessary, however, for
the belief to be as to the probability of guilt of a
crime. Normally this will require a corresponding
belief that a specific crime has been committed,
and thus detention on suspicion of criminality
generally is not allowed.
Possibility Number Two-"Reasonable Suspicion." In order for a detention to be valid, the
officer must reasonably and in good faith suspect
the individual detained of being involved in some
form of criminality. A mere good faith suspicion
will not suffice; it must be such that a reasonable
man would also entertain it. However, it is not
necessary for the officer to have a specific crime in
mind, or if he does, to believe that the person detained probably committed it. Suspicion in this
context means that it must be reasonably possible
that the individual has committed some crime.
Possibility Number Three--"Good Faith Suspicion." The test for determining the validity of a
detention is whether the officer in good faith suspects an individual of engaging in some form of
criminal activity. It is not necessary that the
suspicion be one which reasonable men would also
have, and the officer is not required to have specific
acts of criminality in mind. If he does have some
such specific crime in mind, it is not necessary for
him to believe that the person detained probably
committed it. Suspicion in this context means that
cumstances known to the officer warrant a prudent man
in believing that the offense has been committed."
(Emphasis added.)

the officer must in good faith believe that it is
possible that the individual has committed some
2
crime. i
It should be noted that each of these possibilities
follows the general theory of the concept of probable cause to the extent that an emphasis is placed
upon the degree of mental conviction necessary to
authorize a detention. In this context, it would
seem that possibility number two requiring "reasonable suspicion" is closely analogous to the meaning conveyed by the formulation of the Uniform
Arrest Act in terms of "reasonable ground to suspect '" and would present the best compromise
available short of probable cause. Yet it has been
asserted that reasonable grounds to detain, unlike
reasonable grounds to arrest, can be found in factors extraneous to the officer's state of mind. Thus,
the argument of the government in Rios v. United
States °5 suggested that the test be "reasonable
grounds for inquiry"2 6 and formulated it as follows:
"As to investigation of completed crimes, the
seriousness of the offense, the proximity to or
remoteness from the scene of the crime, the
amount of time which had elapsed, the suspicious circumstances involved, would all have to
be weighed. As to suspicion that a crime has
been or is about to be committed, all the factors
giving rise to suspicion would have to be considered in relation to the nature of the detention.,207
Such an argument contains much that is to be
praised; if the relatively specific requirement of
probable cause is to be disregarded and a lesser
203 All three possibilities should be read in light of a
general policy against the use of the detention privilege
for purposes of harassment. Such police activities,
although not unknown in this country, cannot be constitutionally sanctioned. For a discussion of a particular
example of police harassment of "known criminals" in
Philadelphia, see Foote, Safeguards in the Law of
Arrest, 52 Nw. U.L. REv. 16, 34-36 (1957). See also
Note, Philaddphia Police Practice and the Law of
Arrest, 100 U. PA. L. REv. 1182 (1952).
204 See note 200 supra.
205 364 U.S. 253 (1960). The argument in Rios is substantially identical to that in United States v. Bufalino,
285 F.2d 408 (2d Cir.), reversingon other groundsUnited
States v. Bonanno, 180 F. Supp. 71 (S.D.N.Y. 1960).
206 Brief for United States, p. 12. See Mr. Justice
Burton, concurring in Brinegar v. United States, 338
U.S. 160, 179 (1949). "Government agents are commissioned to represent the interests of the public in the
enforcement of the law and this requires affirmative
action not only when there is reasonable ground for an
arrest or probable cause for a search but when there is
reasonable ground for an investigation."
207Brief for United States, p. 25.
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degree of belief submitted in its place, then other
factors should be taken into consideration to
further safeguard individual rights. To that extent,
the factors listed are representative of those interests to be balanced in determining reasonableness
under all the circumstances. The test, however,
presents some significant problems. It is apparent that it would contribute to an officer's uncertainty and make "unreasonable" turn even more
on the ad hoc reaction of a particular court.'"
Moreover, the use of additional factors in determining reasonableness is a double-edged sword;
depending upon the seriousness of the crime, a
greater or lesser degree of suspicion is required.
Presumably the use of such a sliding scale would
uphold detentions where the public interest was
very high even though no suspicion existed. 219 The
basic source for this "sliding scale" theory in the
area of enforcement of the criminal law is found in
an often quoted statement by Mr. Justice Jackson
that "judicial exceptions to the Fourth Amendment ...should depend somewhat upon the
gravity of the offense."2no It is clear from the context, however, that the statement was made in relation to a hypothetical emergency situation.iU
203

It seems questionable whether such a balancing
test would be acceptable to those who advocate the
extension of police discretion. See, e.g., Waite, Judges
and the Crime Burden, 54 MicH. L. Rxv. 169, 170-71
(1955). "Constitutions forbid 'unreasonable' searches
and seizures, but they do not themselves define what
is unreasonable; that is left to judicial opinion. Hence,
judges have been able to translate their personal notions
of improper conduct into plausible constitutional restrictions by the simple epithetical process of characterizing what they disapprove of as 'unreasonable'
and then declaring it forbidden by the Constitution."
209 The Government's argument in Rios v. United
States, 364 U.S. 253 (1960), also asserts the right to
question in situations where suspicion was not present.
"Thus persons present at the scene of a murder could
legitimately be detained for a short time for questioning
about what they had seen ...whether or not there was
basis for suspicion that any of them had any part in
the crime." Brief for United States, p. 25. It is not clear,
however, whether the right to detain witnesses should be
identically applied to the right to detain suspects. See
text accompanying notes 142-144 supra.
210 Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 183
(1949) (dissenting opinion).
211 The full quotation is as follows:
"But if we are to make judicial exceptions to the
Fourth Amendment for these reasons, it seems to me
they should depend somewhat upon the gravity of
the offense. If we assume, for example, that a child
is kidnaped and the officers throw a roadblock about
the neighborhood and search every outgoing car, it
would be a drastic and undiscriminating use of the
search. The officers might be unable to show probable
cause for searching any particular car. However, I
should candidly strive hard to sustain such an action, executed fairly and in good faith, because it
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Whatever the justification for dispensing with individual liberties in situations where grave emergendes are involved,m it does not necessarily follow
that events occurring in the day-to-day enforcement of the law should be classified within a continuum of more or less serious injuries to the public
interest. Such a test would seem difficult enough
for a court, with adequate opportunity for detached
reflection, to apply; it becomes doubly so, and
hence more dangerous to individual liberties, when
it is remembered that the initial decision will generally be made by a policeman whose primary goal
is to ferret out crime.O
Thus it is clear that consideration of the seriousness of the crime involved as a factor in determining reasonableness presents grave difficulties.
Recognition of these difficulties should temper
enthusiasm with caution; it does not indicate,
however, that such a test would be so flexible as to
be unworkable. A balancing of interests approach
is not necessarily unique to the problem of temporary detention; it has been employed in other areas
of the Fourth Amendment itself. Although Frank
v. Maryland'"specifically turned on the absence of
criminal law enforcement, it is an important precedent in the area of temporary detention for two
reasons. It illustrates the willingness of the Court
to recognize that the traditional protections of the
Fourth Amendment may be flexibly interpreted
when faced with a high degree of public interest,O6
might be reasonable to subject travelers to that
indignity if it was the only way to save a threatened
life and detect a vicious crime. But I should not

strain to sustain such a roadblock and universal
search to salvage a few bottles of bourbon and catch
a bootlegger." Ibid.
It should be noted, moreover, that this illustration
by Mr. Justice Jackson was used to emphasize the
pettiness of the case before him, in which he would not
uphold the search.
212 See Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214
(1944); cf. United States v. Caltex, 344 U.S. 149 (1952).
212 "We must remember, too, that freedom from
unreasonable search differs from some of the other
rights of the constitution in that there is no way the
innocent citizen can invoke advance protection."
Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160 (1949) (dissenting opinion of Jackson, J.). There are, however,
occasional exceptions. In Wirin v. Horrall, 85 Cal. App.
2d 497, 193 P.2d 470 (1948), the court held that an
action would lie to prevent the expenditure of public
funds by restraining Los Angeles police officers from
conducting unconstitutional blockages (stopping and
searching both automobiles and pedestrians).
214359 U.S. 360 (1959).
211 Even the dissent indicated a willingness to dilute
the specific requirement of probable cause, although
it would require the showing to be made to a magistrate. "Experience may show the need for periodic
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and it shows that the Court considers itself capable
of weighing various factors and balancing interests
in order to conclude whether a governmental invasion of privacy was or was not reasonable. The
only distinction between this and the right of
temporary detention is the element of criminal
procedure; a greater risk is involved when the
restraint is a preliminary step in the process which
may ultimately lead to trial and conviction. Admittedly the danger to the security of the individual is greater under such circumstances. Yet it is
not contended that this increased risk is to be
treated as irrevelant; its consideration is necessarily inherent in the nature of the balancing test
involved. Experience in other areas of the law
shows that the element of risk can be weighed
along with the value of the interests protected
2 16
and the social need for the conduct pursued.
Furthermore, it need not follow that such
flexible standards wil indefinitely necessitate an
ad hoc process of decision. By a process of judicial
inclusion and exclusion, specific limits could
emerge in a relatively short period of time while
providing an opportunity in the interim to ascertain their practical effects upon law enforcement
methods and procedures. The development of
specific standards from broad principles is especially appropriate for the process of constitutional
interpretation and, in fact, has been utilized in
determining the applicability of Fourth Amendment standards in other areas. On the question of
health inspections, for example, at least four members of the Court have expressed the opinion that
no prior information about the existence of specific
unsanitary conditions is required.217 Still another
inspections of certain facilities without a further showing of cause to believe that substandard conditions
dangerous to the public are being maintained. The
passage of a certain period without inspection might of
itself be sufficient in a given situation to justify the
issuance of a warrant. The test of 'probable cause required by the Fourth Amendment can take into account
the nature of the search that is being sought." 359 U.S. at
383. (Emphasis added.)
216The standards set for a determination of negligence in the law of torts seem to serve as an appropriate
analog, for the present problem. See PROSSER, TORTS
§30 at 123 (2d ed. 1955). "It is fundamental that the
standard of conduct which is the basis of the law of
negligence is determined by balancing the risk, in the
light of the social value of the interest threatened, and
the probability and extent of the harm, against the
value of the interest which the actor is seeking to
protect, and the expedience of the course pursued."
217See separate opinion of Justices Clark, Frankfurter, Harlan, and Whittaker in Ohio ex rel. Eaton v.
Price, 360 U.S. 264 (1959) (noting probable jurisdic-

instance of the crystallization of Fourth Amendment standards in the absence of probable cause
can be found in the so-called "constructive search"
cases involving the validity of subpoenas duces
tecum. The spirit of the early cases was to test
their validity in the same manner as that of a
search,2 18 while recent decisions show a recognition
of the complexity of business regulation and
authorize such subpoenas when reasonable grounds
for investigation exist.219 Moreover, the present
trend is to regard the demands as presumptively
"reasonable" and to enforce them in the absence
of a clear showing to the contrary.22° It would seem
that certain recurring instances of temporary detention could ultimately be specifically classified
in like manner.nl
The final factor to be considered in determining
the validity of a detention under the first clause of
the Fourth Amendment is the degree of inconvenience caused to the individual. Although this
factor is of primary importance in determining the
permissible nature and extent of a detention, it
may also have limited applicability to the validity
of the initial apprehension itself. The first distinction which may be sought is that between the
stopping of a pedestrian and the stopping of a
moving motor vehicle.2- - Much reliance has been
placedm upon statements by the Supreme Court
that travelers on the highway are entitled to unretion). The judgment was later affirmed per curiam by
an equally divided Court in 364 U.S. 263 (1960). This
opinion as to the need for a specific showing seems to

be shared by the other members of the Court. See note
215 supra. But see Ohio ex rd. Eaton v. Price, 364 U.S.
26321 (1960) (dissenting opinion) (semble).
E.g., Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43 (1906); Boyd v.
United
States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886).
21
9 Oklahoma Press Publishing Co. v. Walling, 327
U.S. 186 (1946); cf. Shapiro v. United States, 335 U.S.
1 (1948).
220
GELLnoR
& Bysx, ADmMr STRA=lE LAW 581
(4th ed. 1960). "The defenses that the subpoena is
unduly vague or unreasonably oppressive, or that it
seeks irrelevant data are often advanced. In such a
case, the typical judicial opinion discusses the facts
relied upon to justify the defense, states that in this
case the defense is not sufficiently meritorious, and concludes that an enforcement order should be issued."
221 Compare the suggestions in Ploscowe, A Modern
Law of Arrest, 39 MmNN. L. R.v. 473 (1955), that cer-

tain situations should be conclusively presumed to
constitute probable cause.
222 A further distinction as to motor vehicles at rest
would seem unwarranted in this context. The degree of
interference with liberty of movement is substantially
identical to that caused to a pedestrian.
223 Foote, Safeguards in the Law of Arrest, 52 Nw.
U.L. REv. 16, 38-39 (1957); Foote, The Fourth Amendment: Obstacle or Necessity in the Law of Arrest?, 51 J.

Cumr. L., C. & P.S. 402, 407-08 (1960).
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stricted freedom of movement.mA These statements,
however, were directed to the validity of searches
for which probable cause was required. To impart
them into a discussion concerning the validity of
temporary detention is to assume the very issue
to be decided.us From the standpoint of inconvenience to the individual, however, the two situations would appear to be substantially identical;
the only difference being that when an automobile
is stopped the existence of an actual restraint is
more apparent. The Supreme Court has never
heard a case where it was asserted that the mere
stopping of a pedestrian constituted an arrest;
for obvious reasons the officer will normally take
great pains to avoid any indication that the individual is under an actual restraint.u 6 When an
automobile is stopped, however, the situation is
not ambiguous; it is untenable to assert that no
actual restraint has been imposed. Thus, assuming
the existence of an actual interference with liberty
of movement in both cases, a per se distinction
between a moving vehicle and a pedestrian would
appear to be invalid. This is not to say, however,
that the initial apprehension of those in a moving
motor vehicle may not present distinctive problems. Because of the element of speed and road
conditions, it would dearly require a higher degree
of suspicion and public interest to justify an apprehension, such as by forcing a car off the road,m
which created a serious risk of physical or emotional
injury to the occupants.n' This is equally true,
of course, even in the presence of probable cause;
224 Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 153-54
(1925). "[T]hose lawfully within the country, entitled
to use the public highways, have a right to free passage
without interruption or search unless there is [probable
cause]." See also Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S.
160,
225 177 (1949).
The right to stop and search should not be confused with the right merely to stop. Although the
Court's language in the cases cited in note 224 supra
is broad enough to foreclose the detention question,
different issues are involved. See cases cited note 143
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the method of arrest or apprehension must always
29
be reasonable.1
The inconvenience caused to the individual by
merely interfering with his forward progress,
either in a car or on foot, would normally seem
minor enough to be countenanced in light of the
public interests involved. A final factor representing potential injury to the individual, however,
remains to be considered. Just as an arrest may
cause damage to a person's reputation,2 1 the same
may be true of a mere stopping under certain circumstances. Again the problem of the automobile
seems to stand conspicuously apart from the
situation of the pedestrian. Because the existence
of the restraint will often not be apparent when a
pedestrian is stopped, the corresponding danger to
his reputation is diminished. The automobile
presents another unique situation due to the fact
that its very nature invites application of the
modern counterpart of the general warrant, the
roadblock. It has been argued that the siguificance
of such generality in apprehension lies in the
limited suspicion directed toward any given individual. To that extent the potential injury to
reputation is substantially avoidedm Yet, whatever the effect such considerations should have in
emergency situationsm and those involving enforcement of traffic codes,m they would seem of
extremely doubtful validity as applied to routine
enforcement of the criminal law. Reliance upon
such a rationale is contrary to the fundamental
policy of the Fourth Amendment; nothing can be
imagined which would cast less suspicion upon any
particular person than the continued use of general warrants. With this reservation, however, the
element of a moving motor vehicle should be considered in determining the reasonableness of the
initial apprehension.
See note 62 supra and accompanying text.

supra.

230See generally Kadish, Legal Norm and Discretion
in the Police and Sentencing Processes, 75 HARV. L.

Detention and Arrest Privileges Under Foreign Law-

21 Note, Search and Seizure in the Supreme Court:
Shadows on the FourthAmendment, 28 U. Cm. L. REv.

226 For an analysis of the distinction between a "command" and a "request" in this area, see Williams, Police

England, 51 J. Calt. L., C. &P.S. 413 (1960).
227 This method was upheld in Brinegar v. United
States, 338 U.S. 160 (1949).
22The
government's argument in Rios v. United
States, 364 U.S. 253 (1960), recognized the distinction
between moving automobiles and pedestrians for this
limited purpose. "[T]hat same basis might not be
sufficient to justify forcing a moving vehicle to the
curb with a police car, or at a further extreme, shooting
at the tires of a vehicle to force it to stop." Brief for

United States, p. 24.

R v. 90 (1962).
664, 701 (1961). "A road block and search of all passing
cars for fleeing robbers implies only limited suspicion
of any given driver; a house-to-house search for a
notorious criminal thought to be in the neighborhood
may be equally innocuous from this standpoint. What
the innocent citizen has most reason to fear is being

singled out as the object of official suspicion."
2

See, e.g., note 211 supra.

2 A road block was upheld under these circumstances
in City of Miami v. Aronovitz, 114 So. 2d 784 (Fla.

1959).
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2. The Nature and Extent of the Detention
There are a limited number of judicial decisions
upholding the right of a police officer to stop a
pedestrian for the purpose of making inquiry.m'
Other cases have held that a similar right exists to
stop an automobile. 5 Most of the cases which have
been cited for this proposition, however, involved
factual situations in which the individual was not
in the process of movement when inquiry was
made.ne Moreover, even those cases which authorize an actual interference with movement by
an initial stopping do not stand for the proposition
that any further restraint can be imposed. With the
exception of United States v. Bonanno,2 subsequent events gave rise to probable cause, and the
issue was thus avoided. Frequently, the courts
made dear that in the absence of these events no
right to detain would have existed.ns Furthermore,
in other cases where an actual restraint was imposed, the courts have held that an arrest was
thereby consummated. 9
no Ellis v. United States, 264 F.2d 372 (D.C. Cir.),
cert. denied, 359 U.S. 998 (1959); Green v. United States,
259 F.2d 180 (D.C. Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 359 U.S.
917 (1959); State v. Gulczynski, 32 Del. 120, 120 Atl.
88 (1922); Johnson v. State, 118 Tex. Crim. 293, 42
S.W.2d 421 (1931); Pena v. State, 111 Tex. Crim. 218,
12 S.W.2d 1015 (1929); State v. Zupon, 155 Wash. 80,
283 Pac. 671 (1929); but see United States v. Sipes, 132
F. Supp. 537 (E.D. Tenn. 1955) (semble).
1 United States v. Bonanno, 180 F. Supp. 71
(S.D.N.Y.), rei'd on other grounds sub non. United
States v. Bufalino, 285 F.2d 408 (2d Cir. 1960);
McCarthy v. United States, 264 F.2d 473 (8th Cir.
1959); Smith v. United States, 264 F.2d 469 (8th Cir.
1959); Bell v. United States, 254 F.2d 82 (D.C. Cir.),
cert. denied, 358 U.S. 885 (1958); Fowler v. United
States, 239 F.2d 93 (10th Cir. 1956) (semble); Gilliam
v. United States, 189 F.2d 321 (6th Cir. 1951); Brinegar
v. United States, 165 F.2d 512 (10th Cir. 1947), ajf'd
on other grounds,338 U.S. 160 (1949). But see Henry v.
United States, 361 U.S. 98 (1959). (See text accompanying note 20 supra.)
236 E.g., Lee v. United States, 221 F.2d 29 (D.C. Cir.
1954); Poulas v. United States, 95 F.2d 412 (9th Cir.
1938); Weathersbee v. United States, 62 F.2d 822 (5th
Cir. 1933); United States v. Rios, 192 F. Supp. 888
(S.D. Cal. 1961); Campbell v. Commonwealth, 203 Ky.
151, 261 S.W. 1107 (1924).
23 180 F. Supp. 71 (S.D.N.Y.), rev'd on other grounds
sub non. United States v. Bufalino, 285 F.2d 408 (2d
Cir. 1960). See also Kavanagh v. Stenhouse, 174 A.2d
560 (R.I. 1961) (upholding the constitutionality of
section two of the Uniform Arrest Act.)
n E.g., Green v. United States, 259 F.2d 180, 181
(D.C. Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 359 U.S. 917 (1959). "He
could have refused to halt. The officers would have had
no right, whatever, then and there without more,
either to seize him or to search him."
2 United States v. Mitchell, 179 F. Supp. 636
(D.D.C. 1959); United States v. Scott, 149 F. Supp. 837
(D.D.C. 1957); Price v. United States, 119 A.2d 718

Thus, presently existing judicial authority for
the right actually to restrain on grounds less than
probable cause is significantly scarce. Yet, although the right merely to stop is not without
importance, M° it is apparent that some right to
detain should also exist under certain circumstances. It would seem, for example, that under
normal circumstances, only minor inconvenience
would be caused to the individual by requiring
him to remain while the officer made further inquiries; as the detention became more pronounced,
a correspondingly higher degree of public interest
and suspicion would be necessary in order to
justify it.2u Furthermore, a failure to respond to
the officer's questions should be considered as a
basis for such justification. m Thus it might be
reasonable in some situations to hold the suspect
until his story could be checked and his identity
verified.
Inquiry on the street and detention for identification, however, should be sharply distinguished
from detention at the police station for purposes
of interrogation. At this point, still another factor
should be added to the list of those considered in
determining reasonableness under all the circum(D.C. Mun. App. 1956). But see Kavanagh v. Stenhouse, 174 A.2d 560 (R.I. 1961).
240 Brief for United States, p. 17, Rios v. United
States, 364 U.S. 253 (1960). "The unexpected appearance of a police officer before a person who has 60
grams of heroinin his pocket may have a drastic impact
upon his sense of well-being and cause him to take some
self-betraying action. And the hope that his official appearance would have that effect was, in fact, the very
reason given by Officer Beckmann for making his
appearance
.... "
241
The extent of the detention is, of course, one of the
factors to be considered in determining reasonableness
under all the circumstances. See text accompanying
note 207 supra.
242 See Gisske v. Sanders, 9 Cal. App. 13, 98 Pac. 43
(1908). A number of cases have implied, however, that
no adverse inference can be drawn from a failure to
answer. E.g., Poulas v. United States, 95 F.2d 412 (9th
Cir. 1938). See United States v. Di Re, 332 U.S. 581,
594-95 (1947). The issue has been characterized as
whether the privilege against self-incrimination applies
to police questioning. Remington, The Law Relatingto
"On the Street" Detention, Questioning and Frisking of
Suspected Personsand PoliceArrestPrivilegesin General,
51 J. Cnms. L., C. & P.S. 386,391 (1960). For discussion
of the privilege in this context, see McNaughton, The
Privilege Against Self-Incrimination, 51 J. CIMI.

L.,

C. & P.S. 138, 151 n.56 (1960). Yet, even it if does
apply to exclude police testimony at trial, it does not
necessarily follow that a failure to answer cannot be
utilized in determining probable cause. See Jones v.
United States, 362 U.S. 257 (1960); Draper v. United
States, 358 U.S. 307 (1959); Brinegar v. United States,
338 U.S. 160 (1949) (evidence need not be legally
competent in order to constitute probable cause).
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stances. "In the Anglo-American law, there is no
regular provision for police examination of a per'
son suspected of crime."2
The absence of such a
provision is implicit in the requirements of the
common law; whether an arrest is made with or
without a warrant, the duty of the officer is to
promptly take the arrested person before a magistrate.3" The practical basis for this rule is apparent; "ours is the accusatorial as opposed to the
inquisitional

system.

' 245

Opportunity

for pro-

longed police interrogation presents the most
dangerous threat to that system."e In the federal
courts, the codification of the common law doctrine respecting prompt arraignmentm has been
enforced by a rule excluding from evidence the
products of an unlawful detention prior to a hearing before a magistrate. 4 This rule itself is not
based upon the constitution; it is the product of
the Supreme Court's supervisory power over the
administration of federal criminal justice and
hence inapplicable to the states.2 9
However, since the decision in Wong Sun v.
United States,250 a constitutional principle requiring the exclusion of evidence under certain circumstances may also be applicable in this area. Although the question was not directly involved in
Wong Sun, it would seem that a violation of the
right to prompt arraignment, being a fundamental
part of the arrest process, would also be a violation
of the Fourth Amendment, and evidence which is
243 Paulsen, The Fourteenth Amendment and the Third
Degree,
6 STAN. L. Rnv. 411 (1954).
2 4
MAcHEN, ARET §48 (1950); VoRHmEs, APuEsT
§§96, 204 (1915); Perkins, The Law of Arrest, 25 IOWA

L. REv. 201, 253-61 (1940).
22 46 Watts v. Indiana, 338 U.S. 49, 54 (1949).

Leibowitz, Safeguards in the Law of Interrogation

and Confessions, 52 Nw. U.L. R1v. 86, 87 (1957). "In
the period between the moment of arrest and the
arraignment arises the only opportunity for wrongdoing
on the part of the police. It is during that period only
that the defendant is usually kept incommunicado, deprived of the right of consulting family or friends.
When abusive methods are used by the police during
that period, the only witnesses are other police. During
the period a suspect is at the mercy of his captors. To
assume that the third degree no longer exists in some
cases
247 is to shut our eyes to reality."
FED. R. CRI.
P. 5(a).
248 Mallory v. United States, 354 U.S. 449 (1957);
Upshaw v. United States, 335 U.S. 410 (1948); McNabb
v. United States, 318 U.S. 332 (1943).
249 E.g., Stein v. New York, 346 U.S. 156 (1953). It
seems doubtful whether the federal rule will be carried
along in the wake of Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961),
which characterized it as a rule of evidence. See Weinstein, Local Responsibilityfor Improvement of Search and
Seizure Practices, 34 RocKY MT. L. REV. 150, 162

(1962).
250 371 U.S. 471 (1963).

the product thereof should be inadmissible upon
constitutional grounds. In any event, it seems
clear that the underlying substantive right which
is here involved is grounded in the constitution.
Its observance is indispensable to a cluster of basic
rights including the right to bail and the right to
habeas corpus.2s Furthermore, as indicated above,
it bears an intimate relationship to the requirement of the Fourth Amendment of reasonable
seizures. "What real meaning is left in the Fourth
Amendment's guaranty against arbitrary arrest
if the arrestee is unable to reach a judicial officer
within a reasonable time to determine whether or
not his arrest was arbitrary?

212

Without an arrest the rule of law based upon
the Supreme Court's supervisory power becomes
theoretically inapplicable; since, by hypothesis,
a detention involves a situation where the purpose
to take a person before a magistrate does not
22
exist, this important safeguard is evaded. This
would not be true, however, as to an exclusionary
rule based upon the Fourth Amendment. The
policy against secret interrogation would seem to
be an overwhelming factor in the determination
of reasonableness under all the circumstances?2'
Moreover, it must be clear that such a result
would not be permitted even under a rule based
solely upon the Supreme Court's supervisory
power. Otherwise, the exclusionary rule could be
avoided by detaining for interrogation in all cases,
thereby postponing the arrest and requirement of
prompt arraignment until the evidence sought had
251 Hogan & Snee, The McNabb-Mallory Rule: Its
Rise, Rationale and Rescue, 47 GEo. L.J. 1, 21-33

(1958).
252 Letter from Yale Kamisar to Thomas C. Henings, Jr., Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Constitutional Rights of the Senate Committee on the Ju-

didary, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 769 (1958).
282 In United States v. Bonanno, 180 F. Supp. 71
(S.D.N.Y.), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. United

States v. Bufalino, 285 F.2d 408 (2d Cir. 1960), this
issue was presented since the majority of the questioning took place in a nearby police station. In its brief on
appeal the government argued that no requirement of
prompt arraignment was involved "because the officers
did not consider the persons whom they detained for
questioning to be under arrest, and so had no intention
of taking them before a magistrate at all.... ." Brief for
United States, pp. 155-56.
25 Section two of the Uniform Arrest Act in Warner,
The Uniform Arrest Act, 28 VA. L. Rav. 315, 343-347
(1942), authorizes a detention period of two hours.
Cases interpreting that provision seem to read it as
authorizing interrogation. See Cannon v. State, 168
A.2d 108 (Del. 1961); De Salvatore v. State, 163 A.2d
244 (Del. 1960); Wilson v. State, 49 Del. 37, 109 A.2d
381 (1954), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 983 (1955).
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been obtained. Such a result would be clearly
untenable.
3. Search Incident to a Detention
Section three of the Uniform Arrest Act provides
that an officer may search any person detained
"whenever he has reasonable ground to believe
that he is in danger if the person possesses a
dangerous

weapon." 25 '

Despite

the

semantic

sleight of hand with "reasonable ground to
believe,"2 18 this provision is dearly intended to
authorize a search on lesser grounds than probable
cause.2 n7 When the Court heretofore has spoken of
a search incident to an arrest, it has, of course,
referred to an arrest based upon probable cause.
Yet it seems unrealistic to expect an officer to
refrain from "frisking 258 when his personal
security hangs in the balance.259 Thus, as a practical matter, the need for such authority seems
apparent. Subject to the criteria of reasonableness
under all the circumstances, it should be allowed
concurrently with the right of temporary detention.
Theoretical justification for the doctrine within
the scope of the Fourth Amendment may be found
in an analogy to the analysis of the right to search
incident to a valid arrest. In discussing this right
two possible rationales were suggested. That
relied upon to authorize a broad search of the
premises was based upon the theory that probable
cause for the arrest also provided probable cause
for the search. 260 Obviously, such a rationale lends
no support for a search incident to detention,
whether of the person or of his immediate surroundings. The alternate justification, however,
that the right to search a person is subsumed
2' Warner The Uniform Arrest Act, 28 VA. L. REv.

315, 343-47 (1942).
218 This formulation of "reasonable ground to believe"
virtually emasculates it since when questioning a suspidous person, the officer would, by hypothesis, be in
danger
if the person possessed a dangerous weapon.
2 7 See generally text accompanying notes 87-105
supra.
253
The terms "frisking" or "patting down" are found
in a large number of the cases and legal writings.
Basically they connote a very limited search over the
exterior of the person detained in order to ascertain the
presence of any suspicious "bulges" which would result
from
the concealment of a weapon.
2
-9 Perkins, The Tennessee Law of Arrest, 2 VAND. L.
RE V. 509, 618 (1949). "As pointed out previously, a
'frisk' should be recognized as entirely lawful, even
without arrest, whenever this is a reasonable safety precaution." See also Comment, SonieProposalsforModern
izing the Law of Arrest, 39 CALIF. L. REv. 96 (1951).
260

See text accompanying note 92 supra.

within the concept of arrest,' provides an important analogy in circumstances where probable
cause does not exist. The essential rationale, that
the right to take an individual into custody
includes the right also to take into custody all
that is found upon his person, can be equally
applied to the right to temporarily detain. Since
even a limited search involves a more drastic
interference with the privacy of the individual,
a correspondingly higher degree of suspicion and
public interest is necessary to make it reasonable
under all the circumstances; probable cause,
however, is not required.
Although it is readily apparent that situations
may sometimes demand the use of a "frisking"
technique, this interference with the person of the
individual should not become a matter of routine.
The purpose of the privilege is not to obtain
evidence of guilt; it is for the protection of the
officer involved. 2 2 Judicial authority is scant, but
that which does exist indicates that at least this
limitation should be set.62

It is totally a different

thing to authorize a superficial "patting" to
determine the presence of a weapon than to allow
a thorough inspection of all that the person has
in his possession.6- 4
V. CONCLUSION

The thesis of this paper is that a more flexible
compromise than today exists between the right
of privacy and legitimate police desires can be
reached within the framework of the Fourth
Amendment. The standard of "probable cause"
does not seem to have satisfactorily done its job.
The result has been a hodgepodge of "vagrancy"
statutes which often do little more than to make
"being suspicious" a crime265 and widespread
See text accompanying note 89 supra.
anything uncovered would not be
subject to the exclusionary rule if the search were in
good faith limited to the search for a weapon. See note 80
261

262Presumably,

supra.
263 Compare Gisske v. Sanders, 9 Cal. App. 13, 98 Pac.

43 (1908), with People v. Simon, 45 Cal. 2d 645, 290
P.2d 531 (1955). See Ellis v. United States, 264 F.2d
372 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 359 U.S. 998 (1959); Lee v.
United States, 221 F.2d 29 (D.C. Cir. 1954); United
States v. Sipes, 132 F. Supp. 537 (E.D. Tenn. 1955);
People v. Henneman, 367 Ill.
151, 10 N.E.2d 649
(1937).
264 See People v. Simon, supranote 263.
265 See, e.g., Foote, Vagrancy-Type Law and Its Administration, 104 U. PA. L. REV. 603 (1956); Note, Use
of Vagrancy-Type Laws for the Arrest and Detention of
Suspicious Persons, 59 YAI L.J. 1351 (1950).
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evasion of the law.26 6 It would be far better to face
the issue squarely and set up a system of intelligent
safeguards which protect the security of the
individual and, at the same time, do not unduly
restrict the police in the performance of their
duties.
Conceptually, this flexibility can be justified
within the Fourth Amendment by the detentionarrest distinction and a reliance upon the broad
provision contained in the amendment's first
clause. A test of reasonableness under all the
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circumstances may be the only solution to the
present problem which can honestly be said to
fulfill the policy of the constitutional provision.a
The sole objection to such a test must necessarily lie in its vagueness. Doubtless, this would
present some difficulty in initial application. Yet
there is no reason to suspect that the Court would
be incapable of eliciting fundamental standards
through a process of judicial inclusion and exclusion. Thus it would seem difficult to conclude
that the vice of vagueness is a sufficient reason for
discarding a formulation of reasonableness under
all the circumstances; a certain amount of such
266 See, e.g., Tresolini, Taylor & Barnett, Arrest Without a Warrant: Extent and Social Implications, 46 vagueness is rather of the essence of a constituJ. Cane, L., C. & P.S. 187 (1955); Note, Philadelphia tional principle.
Police Practice and the Law of Arrest, 100 U. PA. L.
217
Barrett, PersonalRights, Property Rights, and the
R:Ev. 1182 (1952); Yankivich, The Lawless Enforcement of the Law, 9 So. CA. L. RFv. 14 (1935).
FourthAmendment, 1960 Sup. CT. REv. 46, 63.

